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Abstract
What is addiction? Since its transformation as a word in the late 19th century, not only has it
taken on the form of a scientific concept, but it also contains a complex social-historical
component that tells a story of how and why addiction is now conceived of as a harmful and
deviant behaviour. The objective of this text is to highlight how addiction fundamentally eclipses
scientific discourses and instead functions as a social concept in the interests of colonization –
comprised of forces of State and capitalism. Based on a critical reading of Mircea Eliade’s The
Sacred and the Profane, we will find that the colonizing forces of State and capitalism express
the post-modern form of the sacred, wherein rituals that sustain the sacred world are deemed
good and promoted, whereas those rituals which threaten the State or capitalist mode of being are
classified as bad, or profane. Thus, we will contrast the figure of the sports fanatic through
his/her participation on online forums as they exhibit institutional characteristics of addiction, to
the criminalized and demonized subjects and objects of addiction, with the intent of portraying
two forms of institutional addiction with contrasting relations to colonial ideals. Moreover, in
three films by Satyajit Ray (The Music Room, The Chess Players, and Charulata), we will not
only see how social processes delineate the primary nature of the drug/user relationship which
characterizes addiction, but also how forces of colonization repurpose rituals to serve colonial
ideals. By tracing the transformation of the word addiction to authoritative relations with
drunkenness, it will become evident how the impositions of morality and higher social forces
have made addiction a social tool and a concept irreconcilable with scientific theories. Finally, in
contrasting texts by Gabor Maté, Bruce Alexander and Stanton Peele, with texts by Harry
Levine, Alfred Lindesmith and Thomas Szasz, we will see distinguishing types of discourses
which attempt to address the problem ‘what is addiction?’

Key words: addiction, colonization, ritual, capitalism, discourse, science, drugs, sports,
sports fan, film, Satyajit Ray, Eliade, Foucault, Deleuze, Guattari.

ii

Acknowledgments
This thesis represents the cumulative effort of many people, whose large or small contributions
have greatly affected the outcome. I owe a great deal of gratitude to Dr. Ariel Fuenzalida, who
gave me opportunity and endless academic feedback. I would also like to express sincere thanks
to my supervisor Dr. Daniel Vaillancourt, and my second reader, Dr. Michael Gardiner, for their
contributions. Lastly, my friends and family who shine bright, giving energy and meaning to
every day.

Table of Contents
Abstract…………………………………………………………………………………………...i
Acknowledgments………………………………………………………………………………..ii
Introduction………………………………………………………………………........................1
More than a Scientific Concept……………………………………………............................2
Problematizing Discourses of Addiction….…..……………...………………………………4
Chapter 1
Discourses of Addiction: a false problematic..…………………………………………………...7
What is Addiction and What are its Limits?.............................................................................9
We Still Do Not Understand Addiction…………………………………………………12
The Transformation of Addiction: the ‘Harmfulness’ model………………………………..18
Opium Laws and the Further Legitimation of Addiction……………………………….22
Addiction as a Territorialized Subject and Object……………………………………....26
Addiction and Religion as a Sense of Belonging…………………………………….....30
Chapter 2
Profane Addictions in a Sacred World: the sports fanatic as drug addict…………………...…..34
Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane in Addiction…..……………………………...………37
The Economy of Drugs………………………………………………………………….42
The Sports Fanatic as Drug Addict…………………………………………………………..46
The Colonization of Sports……………………………………………………………...48
Online Discourses of the Sports Fanatic……………………..…………………………52
Chapter 3
Distinguishing Between Discourses Of and On Addiction……………………………………...67
The Nature of Addiction…….……………………………………………….........................68
Discourses Of Addiction Territorialize the Story of the Addict………………………...72
Discourses On Addiction from the Films of Satyajit Ray…………………………………...75
Jalsaghar (The Music Room, 1958)…………………………………………………….78
Shatrank-ke-Khilatri (The Chess Players, 1977)………………………………………..82
Charulata (1964)………………………………………………………………………..86
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………….90
Bibliography……………………………………………………………………………………..92
Curriculum Vitae………………………………………………………………………………...97

1

Introduction
In 2013, psychologists Robert West and Jamie Brown published a second edition of their text
Theory of Addiction. In it, not only do they attempt to construct a testable scientific theory of
addiction, but they do so “to address the significant challenges that addiction presents to modern
society” (Brown and West, ii). These two points characterize a type of discourse which will be
problematized in this text, a discourse of addiction. Based on these discourses, our contention is
that the transformation of the word addiction in the late 19th to 20th century has not produced a
scientifically acceptable theory of addiction and that this is in large part due to the function of
harmfulness in the concept. Brown and West elaborate on the role which ‘harmfulness’ plays in
defining addiction by making it a distinguishing characteristic from the condition of
‘dependence’1: “It may be useful to distinguish between addiction as a repeated powerful
motivation to engage in a rewarding but harmful behaviour and ‘physical dependence’ as a state
of physiological adaptation to a drug which then needs to be taken to prevent adverse withdrawal
symptoms” (Brown and West, 12).
As the determination of what constitutes harmfulness represents a moralistic function (while
science only tells us that we’re dying, morals define it as ‘bad’), the question of addiction –
‘what is addiction?’ – implicates more than simply a scientific theory, which forms the basis of a
discourse of addiction. At stake in a discourse on addiction is an economy of control (individual
1

Brown and West note that, while at one point the definition of addiction followed the characteristics of what we
now call dependence, harm is now a primary component of the concept: “…for a long period, there remained the
same theme of addiction involving a state of physiological adaptation to [the] presence of a drug in the body so that
absence of the drug leads to physiological dysfunction which is manifest to the sufferer as unpleasant or even lifethreatening ‘withdrawal symptoms’. An addict was someone who needed to take a drug in order to maintain normal
physiological functioning…Nowadays, the term ‘addiction’ tends to be applied to a syndrome at the centre of which
is impaired control over a behaviour to a degree that is causing or could cause significant harm” (Brown and West,
11).
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and collective) and its history of conquest. In this respect, this text addresses how the function of
morality (as a concept of power) not only facilitated a scientific concept of addiction, but
rationalized the colonization of people and drugs.
More Than a Scientific Concept
So long as morality factors into the equation, addiction is not simply a scientific concept. In spite
of Brown and West’s recognition that theories of addiction are “social constructs,” wherein a
definition would “serve a [social] purpose” (Brown and West, 44), their text, along with all
discourses of addiction whose purpose is to forward a scientific theory of addiction, creates a
scientific concept out of a moral classification – akin to classifying professional athletes or
nuclear physicists as scientifically higher forms of the human species.
The scientific theory of addiction excludes crucial social components of addiction, wherein we
may trace the use of the word ‘addiction’ to a much earlier epoch, but one which has no
connection to the connotations of the contemporary notion: “The Oxford English Dictionary
traces the term ‘addiction’ back to Roman Law where it involved ‘the formal delivery of a
person or property to an individual, typically in accordance with a judicial decision’” (Brown
and West, 11). And yet, the scientific theorization will gloss over social developments and
simply proclaim that “by the end of the nineteenth century, physicians were becoming
increasingly interested in the scientific study of addiction…Early efforts in this direction focused
on establishing addiction as a medical disease rather than a moral or spiritual issue” (ibid).
Unconcerned, scientific theories of addiction are based on a concept whose religious, State and
economic2 basis rationalized the marginalization of substances (alcohol, hemp/cannabis3,
2

The ‘harm’s which rationalized the eradication of the poor and drugs such as heroin and cocaine not only consist of
the notion of self-harms, but social harms: Therefore, while Erickson notes that “the criminalization of drugs in
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opium/heroin, coca/cocaine/crack4) and social groups (immigrants5, the poor6). The concept of
addiction, therefore, is ineludibly connected to the fact that “the origin of Canada's anti-drug
laws in 1908 had little to do with the dangers associated with illicit drug use – these laws were
based on public fear as well as on political and monetary gains” (Gordon, 8).
The problem of a moral basis for a scientific concept of addiction is not only that it is a highly
uncontrollable variable (which has rightfully led to inter-disciplinary confusion and an inability
to construct an acceptable scientific theory), but the prescription of morals are also subject to
forms of power that produce social distinctions in order to further colonize social spaces by
marginalizing the ‘undesirable’ and promoting the ideal. In respect to the concept of addiction,
Canada was made possible because of the strongly held belief that certain drugs had the ability to enslave users”
(Erickson 1992:247), “many people believe that illegal drugs result in lower productivity, extra costs to health care,
business loss, and significant law enforcement costs; specifically police, courts, and prisons” (Oscapella 1998).
Retrieved from (Howard, 2003).
3
The relation between ‘hemp’ and ‘marijuana’ was constructed by William Randolph Hearst, who “was able to
exploit white America’s bigotry toward the Mexican immigrants by artificially creating a fear of marijuana
as a dangerous intoxicant. As Robert Deitch notes, Hearst “had a financial interest in outlawing hemp. Now that he
owned so much forest land, he had no interest in returning to hemp-based paper. Furthermore, Deitch continues,
noting that “although the utilization of hemp had severely declined after the Civil War, it was reemerging as a viable
basic raw material because of the 1917 introduction of a machine designed by George Schlichten, known as the
‘Decorticator’.” However, “the cultivation and use of hemp certainly did threaten the monopolies of Rockefeller,
Mellon, Hearst, and the DuPont Chemical Company, in several markets (fuel, paper and plastics). The evidence
indicates that, as indirectly and discreetly as possible, they set out to eliminate the competition” (Deitch, 115).
4
“In the United States, between the years of 1983-1993, the number of incarcerated drug offenders increased form
57,000 to 353,000. In 1996, one in every four prisoners was either awaiting trial or serving time for drug-related
offences. Within this, the number of black people arrested for drug offences increased from 24% to 39%. In 1996,
Blacks and Hispanics combined constituted nearly 90% of all prisoners sentenced to state prisons for drug offences
(Mauer 1996:11). Black people are only 12% of the entire United States population. Some of these disparities can be
explained by the racism that exists in laws for crack cocaine versus powder cocaine. It takes five grams of crack to
get five years in federal prison versus 500 grams of powder cocaine. Ninety-four percent of 3,430 crack defendants
in federal courts in 1994 were black (Mauer 1996:11). It is clear that incarceration with relation to illicit drugs in
the United States is based on racism” (Howard, 16).
5
In the case of opium it was a racial and economic endeavour: In the 1880’s, when “the Chinese became an
economic threat’ to other Canadians,” “hostility towards Chinese began to be reflected in legislation, which was
designed to end Chinese immigration and drive the Chinese out of the economic mainstream in Canada.” This
resulted in the passing of The Opium Act of 1908, “Canada's first anti-drug legislation” (Howard, 10).
6
“Marijuana is perhaps the most widely used recreational intoxicant other than alcohol. It was traditionally known
as a poor man’s intoxicant. Marijuana was always available at low cost, or no cost; whereas alcohol is harder to
produce at home. Not surprisingly, the first anti-marijuana laws coincided with the massive migration of Hispanics
into the United States because of the Mexican Revolutionary War. Before Alcohol Prohibition, marijuana was only
illegal in a few Southern and Western states; that was purely intended to discourage settlement of black or Latino
populations” (Deitch, 158).
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the (empowered) function of determining what constitutes harmfulness has historically exceeded
a scientific basis: drunkenness was tolerated and unclassified for generations (one would often
refer to a drunkard as having a strong ‘love’ for the drink), until the drunkard’s inability (or lack
of desire) to fulfill their social duties led to not only contempt for the behaviour, but an attempt
to eradicate it and classify it as a disease of ‘dependence’. In this example, we see how the
classification of ‘addiction’ followed a desire to eradicate (colonize) a population of people or
drugs. Therefore, while there continue to be ongoing clinical researches – in neuroscience,
biology, psychology, chemistry, sociology – in search for the perfect theory of addiction, the
concept of addiction invariably lies beyond the sciences.
Problematizing Discourses of Addiction
How do we account for a scientific theory of addiction based on moral precepts of harm? While
the task of a discourse of addiction is to propose a theory of addiction as a singular medical
condition, a discourse on addiction does not attempt to solve the scientific problem ‘what is
addiction?’ but rather it is based on delineating such a concept, as each of the next three chapters
attempt to do.
The first chapter introduces addiction as a concept of power – discursively, materially and
socially, all of which are implicated in the discourses of Bruce Alexander (The Globalisation of
Addiction), Gabor Maté (In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts), Harry Levine (The Discovery of
Addiction), Alfred Lindesmith (The Addict and the Law), Thomas Szasz (Ceremonial
Chemistry), Jonathan Ott (Pharmacotheon), the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM), the Controlled Substances Act and the Harrison Act. The response to
drunkenness by religious temperance members will be highlighted to illustrate the transformation
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of the word addiction into a medical condition by virtue of the power and contempt facing
drunkenness. As the medical condition of addiction was formed based on a moral precept, we
find that contemporary research in addiction is in a helpless state of trying to scientifically
explain addiction. Moreover, addiction will be shown to be a social concept which functions
based on the ability to materialize moral distinctions, as it will be shown to do not only for
religious temperance members, but as part of a larger movement of State and economic
colonization, whose domination supplanted pre-modern religions.
In the second chapter, based on the text The Sacred and the Profane by Mircea Eliade, the
modern conquest by State and economic forces will be evoked as a religious function, which will
implicate the creation of the sacred world and its ritualizations, and the opposing world and
rituals of the profane. We will focus particular attention on the relation between sacred power
and rituals, as sacred rituals become promoted (because they sustain the sacred world) and
profane rituals are marginalized (because they threaten the sacred world). While the first section
incorporates the religious function of distinguishing between ‘the good’ and ‘the bad’, the second
section will delineate the scientific concept of addiction based on a contrast to sports and the
sports fanatic. While historical discourses will trace the colonization of sports and the sports
fanatic by State and economic forces in order to invoke a social war on rituals that implicates
drug addictions, online discourses of hockey and soccer (football) fanatics will be incorporated
to illustrate strong characteristics of conventional notions of addiction, which is meant to further
dissolve the supposed continuum of addiction.
The third chapter revisits addiction as a discursive, material and social concept of power, namely
in three films by Satyajit Ray: Jalsaghar (The Music Room – 1958), Shatrank-ke-Khilatri (The
Chess Players – 1977), and Charulata (1964). These films facilitate a discourse on addiction,
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based on their depictions of subjects of addiction. Specifically, each individual story of addiction
is ineludibly related to greater social forces that have and are in the process of colonizing rituals.
Thus, a ritualization of idleness, in the form of chess, is inextricably linked to an absence of
necessity of working for aristocratic landlords. Moreover, we will see how perceptions by sacred
powers inform the harmfulness of ‘addictive’ behaviours, implying that the classification of a
condition known as addiction based on moral precepts of harm is an effect of colonization.

7

Chapter 1
Discourses of Addiction: a false problematic

In a survey of modern texts of addiction, one ineludibly encounters a frequent question: ‘what is
addiction?’ How can there be a simultaneous failure to understand the concept of addiction and a
social history predicated on its categorical presence? The objective here is not to solve this
question of addiction, but rather to regard the question as the very problem which produced and
now sustains a concept that carries the form of a truth. There is a crucial difference between
trying to solve the problem ‘what are the universal characteristics of addiction?’ and
problematizing the object and the subject of addiction. To speak or to write of addiction is to
presuppose the reality of the thing as we have been told about it. Conversely, this text may be
considered on addiction because it is a problematization of the discourses of addiction which
have formed our knowledge (and its respective manifestations). In that respect, a discourse on
addiction incorporates the genealogical approach7.
Anyone can believe that there is a nature to such a thing as addiction, but a discourse’s relation
to power confers legitimation and truth8 to the concept. The role of discourse in addiction
invokes the works of Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, wherein there is a

7

In the essay What Is Enlightenment? Michel Foucault invokes his genealogical method as it relates to the subject by
asking: “How are we constituted as subjects of our own knowledge? How are we constituted as subjects who
exercise or submit to power relations? How are we constituted as moral subjects of our own actions?” (Foucault
Reader, 49).
8
A truth is, as Nietzsche wrote in his essay On Truth and Lies, an illusion which we have forgotten is an illusion,
and yet still remains a source of knowledge: “A mobile army of metaphors, metonymies, anthropomorphisms,
in short a sum of human relations which have been subjected to poetic and rhetorical intensification, translation, and
decoration, and which, after they have been in use for a long time, strike a people as firmly established, canonical,
and binding” (The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, 146)
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palpable relationship between power and knowledge, especially as it pertains to the
territorialization9 of the object and the subject:
“…in any society, there are manifold relations of power which permeate, characterise
and constitute the social body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be
established, consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation,
circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise of
power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates through and
on the basis of this association. We are subjected to the production of truth through
power and we cannot exercise power except through the production of truth.”
(Power/Knowledge, 93).
Whether something is legal or illegal, prohibited or promoted, does not reflect a natural
(universal) essence, but rather a power over the body and the word.
While discourses of addiction rely on a Cartesian model of the body10 by reference to either
physiological symptoms, self-destructive habits, or a sense of belonging11 this text follows the
genealogical method of Foucault, whose purpose in The History of Sexuality was to “analyze
sexuality as a historically singular form of experience…to treat sexuality as the correlation of a
domain of knowledge [savoir], a type of normativity, and a mode of relation to the self…”
(Essential Works, 199-200)12. In this respect, this chapter will not only trace our contemporary
meaning of addiction back to its transformation (re-signification) in the 19th century and into the
9

In Anti-Oedipus, Deleuze and Guattari initiate the language of territorialization: “The primitive territorial machine,
with its immobile motor, the earth, is already a social machine, a megamachine, that codes the flows of production,
the flows of means of production, of producers and consumers…” (Anti-Oedipus, 112)
10
“Starting from the assumption of a purely mechanical body,” Silvia Federici notes that the reduction of the
Cartesian body to “mechanical matter allows for the development of mechanisms of self-management that make the
body the subject of the will” (Federici, 148).
11
While physiological symptoms and a harmful behaviour (typically of drug use) form the two main pillars of the
modern transformation of the concept of addiction, we will also highlight Bruce Alexander’s more recent (compared
to the earlier transformative discourses of addiction in the late 19th and 20th century) discourse of addiction which
claims that addiction provides a social sense of belonging.
12
“My object was…to decipher how, in Western societies, a complex experience is constituted from and around
certain forms of behavior: an experience that conjoins a field of knowledge [connaissance] (with its own concepts,
theories, diverse disciplines), a collection of rules (which differentiate the permissible from the forbidden, natural
from monstrous, normal from pathological, what is decent from what is not, and so on), and a mode of relation
between the individual and himself (which enables him to recognize himself as a sexual subject amid others)”
(Essential Works, 200)
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21st century, ostensibly beginning with the religious temperance movement, but it also asks how
addiction works13, following Deleuze and Guattari’s assemblage theory14. The focus in this
chapter therefore will be on sources of authority that have contributed to the production of a
knowledge of addiction.
The difference between a discourse on addiction and a discourse of addiction is present in the
texts of addiction by Bruce Alexander (The Globalisation of Addiction) and Gabor Maté (In the
Realm of Hungry Ghosts), and the texts on addiction by Harry Levine (The Discovery of
Addiction), Alfred Lindesmith (The Addict and the Law), Thomas Szasz (Ceremonial Chemistry)
and Jonathan Ott (Pharmacotheon). The former texts are chosen because, despite the fact they
revert to an attempt to answer the question ‘what is addiction?’ by presupposing the conventional
affects and reaffirming the concept, they also precipitate an effective problematization of the
question. The latter texts, most notably Lindesmith and Levine’s, are a methodological
genealogy of the development of the concept. While these texts scrupulously document the role
of law and the temperance movement in transforming the referents of addiction in the 19th and
20th century, Thomas Szasz and Jonathan Ott articulate the assemblages which grew from and
now sustain addiction, from the 20th century to the present.
I. What Is Addiction and What Are Its Limits?
One of the crucial points of a discourse on addiction is that the traditional conception of
addiction was transformed in the late 19th century onward into its now unrecognizable form. The
13

“We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are, how they can or
cannot enter into composition with other affects, with the affects of another body” (A Thousand Plateaus, 257). The
same methodology can be seen in Foucault, especially in texts such as The History of Sexuality.
14
Assemblage theory is an implicit component of the theories of Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as insisted by
Manuel De Landa: “An assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social
flows simultaneously…The only assemblages are machinic assemblages of desire and collective assemblages of
enunciation” (A Thousand Plateaus, 22).
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two main features of this transformation are: (1) the modern conception of addiction holds no
resemblance to its prior referents; (2) the context which precipitated the change was anything but
scientific. As this chapter traces the genealogy of these two points, the presupposed
contemporary criteria of addiction come starkly into question.
The conception of addiction prior to the temperance movement contained two elements: a
judicial15 element and a social16 element. It is crucial to note that, as psychologist Bruce
Alexander asserts in The Globalisation of Addiction, “the examples of usage over the centuries
that are provided by the dictionary show that addiction, thus defined, may or may not be
destructive to the addicted individual and to society…strong devotion (i.e. addiction) to a worthy
cause or a benevolent god can be the foundation of a positive, fulfilling life” (Alexander, 28).
The implication of this notion of addiction is the capacity to devote oneself to a pursuit.
Therefore, the pre-modern location of addiction is not strictly in the body or in the substance, but
instead refers to a potential devoting relationship. More importantly, however, is the inherent
ambiguity within this conception – it is not associated with a moralistic judgment or
categorization of the pursuit.
The purpose of a genealogical investigation, then, is to understand how the conception illustrated
above became transformed into what addiction exists as today. The contemporary and dominant
discourses of addiction contain mainly medical (including scientific) and state assemblages
which produce diverse images of addiction and the addict. The addiction assemblage is now
15

“In Roman law the word addicere had the more prosaic job of signifying a giving or binding-over of something or
someone by sentence of a court: the assignation of slave to master, debtor to creditor” (Farrell and Redfield, 2). “The
traditional English definition appeared in the first ‘fascicule’ of the authoritative dictionary of the English language,
the Oxford English Dictionary, published in 1884: Addiction…1. Rom Law. A formal giving over or delivery by
sentence of court. Hence, a surrender, or dedication, of any one to a master” (Alexander, 27-8).
16
“That legal meaning gave rise to a now obsolete English verb, “to addict,” meaning “to bind, attach, or devote
oneself or another as a servant, disciple, or adherent, to some person or cause.” (Farrell and Redfield, 2). Part two of
the definition from the 1884 OED states addiction as being: “2. The state of being (self-) addicted or given to a habit
or pursuit; devotion” (Alexander, 27).
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primarily characterized by the law and drugs: while medical and state acceptance of addictions to
pursuits such as gambling have recently gained recognition, they lack the legislative force which
controlled substances encounter. Drug addiction, then, is the face of contemporary and dominant
discourses of addiction.
According to these discourses, what is addiction? Based on the most recent publication of the
‘Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders’ (DSM-V) by the American Psychiatry
Association (APA), addiction is a ‘substance use disorder’, which combines the categories of
‘substance abuse’ and ‘substance dependence’ from previous DSM’s, namely DSM-IV. The
current definition of addiction, according to the APA17, is “a condition in which the body must
have a drug to avoid physical and psychological withdrawal symptoms. Addiction’s first stage
is dependence, during which the search for a drug dominates an individual’s life. An addict
eventually develops tolerance, which forces the person to consume larger and larger doses of the
drug to get the same effect” (APA). The discrepancy between the traditional and contemporary
form of addiction is clearly evident, as are the elements of contemporary addiction: based
entirely on drug use, addiction is characterized by symptoms such as tolerance and withdrawal,
which compel the drug addict to continue using. Described this way, addiction takes on the form
of a symptomatic classification18.

17

According to the DSM-V, addiction, now labelled as ‘substance use disorder’, is characterized by symptoms of:
tolerance; withdrawal; dosage; craving; unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and
recovering; usage getting in the way of social or occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in
spite of knowledge of physical or psychological harms associated with use (DSM IV and V).
18
As Brown and West note, “A feature of the definition of addiction that currently prevails is that it is a clinical
disorder and in fact it is a disorder of motivation. We also know that it is chronic and in many cases life-threatening.
Like most psychiatric disorders, and many physical disorders, it is diagnosed by reference to a set of symptoms
rather than an underlying pathology. There is no laboratory test or scan that can be used to say that an individual is
suffering from addiction; the symptoms are the sole means of determining whether the disease is present in any one
case. But the symptoms are only markers and, for various reasons, an individual may have some symptoms but not
others” (Brown and West, 20).
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Addiction is not only encountered medically, however, but also by the state. The Controlled
Substances Act (CSA) of the United States of America stipulates that “the term 'addict' means any
individual who habitually uses any narcotic drug so as to endanger the public morals, health,
safety, or welfare, or who is so far addicted to the use of narcotic drugs as to have lost the power
of self-control with reference to his addiction” (CSA). In this case, the “addict” is subject to the
CSA only in relation to his/her abuse of an illegal substance, wherein substances are criminalized
based on several factors, such as “actual or relative potential for abuse,” “scope, duration, and
significance of abuse,” or its “psychic or physiological dependence liability” (ibid). The addict,
therefore, is not only a pathological subject, but also a criminal. While the purpose of this
legislation is evidently to limit the availability of harmful substances which people become
addicted to, the availability of these drugs on the ‘black market’ coupled with the conventional
pathological notion of addiction creates the reality of a highly criminalized subject.
We Still Do Not Understand Addiction
Gabor Maté is a clinical doctor who works with addicts (typically of heroin or crack cocaine) in
the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, Canada’s most notorious drug and addiction haven. His
book In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts encapsulates the false problem of modern addiction: it tries
to answer the question ‘what is addiction?’ while it also names, categorizes and defines it.
Therefore, while Maté ponders “how to understand the death grip of drug addiction? What keeps
Penny injecting after the spinal suppuration that nearly made her paraplegic? Why can’t Beverly
give up shooting cocaine despite the HIV, the recurring abscesses I’ve had to drain on her body
and the joint infections that repeatedly put her in hospital?” (Maté, 194), he equivocally
determines the condition of addiction several times within his text, wavering between the two
different locations: addiction is either a physiological compulsion, or it is the inability to quit a
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habit which produces negative consequences (he also makes reference to an addiction as a
“home,” but he doesn’t elaborate an argument for it). And yet the lack of clarity or understanding
of addiction can be traced in Maté’s text through his clinical references to the location of
addiction as being concurrently a disease of compulsion19 but also the resulting negative
consequences,20 neither of which provide a sufficient understanding of addiction for Maté21.
While these two locations are historical developments which form the presupposed affects of
addiction, the salient point is that while an understanding of addiction remains equivocal,
discourses of addiction project a reality that there is something (addiction) that makes addicts do
things they shouldn’t do22. This is the language of drug addiction, where the cart was put before
the horse: to determine behaviour as being of a state of loss of control is a discursive function; to
operationalize and prove it in clinical studies is a scientific function. How can we accept the
arbitrary determination of drug addiction as being inherently led by a ‘loss of control’? It was
only after drug addiction was categorized as containing a destructive loss of control did science
begin to try filling the empirical void, which attempts to fulfill the historical prophecies:

19

“In the words of a consensus statement by addiction experts in 2001, addiction is a ‘chronic neurobiological
disease … characterized by behaviors that include one or more of the following: impaired control over drug use,
compulsive use, continued use despite harm, and craving’. [D.K. Hall-Flavin and V.E. Hofmann, “Stimulants,
Sedatives and Opiates,” in Neurological Therapeutics, vol. 2, ed. J.H. Noseworthy (London and New York: Martin
Dunitz, 2003), 1510–18.]” (Maté, 92).
20
“The key features of substance addiction are the use of drugs or alcohol despite negative consequences, and
relapse … The issue is not the quantity or even the frequency, but the impact. ‘An addict continues to use a drug
when evidence strongly demonstrates the drug is doing significant harm…. If users show the pattern of
preoccupation and compulsive use repeatedly over time with relapse, addiction can be identified.’ [N.S. Miller and
M.S. Gold, “A Hypothesis for a Common Neurochemical Basis for Alcohol and Drug Disorders,” Psychiatric
Clinics of North America 16(1) (1993): 105–17.]” (ibid).
21
“Helpful as such definitions are, we have to take a broader view to understand addiction fully… To get anywhere
near a complete picture we must keep shaking the kaleidoscope to see what other patterns emerge.” (Maté, 93).
22
“Because the addiction process is too multifaceted to be understood within any limited framework, my definition
of addiction made no mention of “disease.” Viewing addiction as an illness, either acquired or inherited, narrows it
down to a medical issue. It does have some of the features of illness, and these are most pronounced in hardcore
drug addicts like the ones I work with in the Downtown Eastside. But not for a moment do I wish to promote the
belief that the disease model by itself explains addiction or even that it’s the key to understanding what addiction is
all about. Addiction is “all about” many things” (Maté, 94).
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“Brain science is at the core of our future understanding of how drugs affect
behaviour…Major advances have been made on two fronts. First, our understanding
of the major neural components of the ‘reward’ or reinforcement system in the brain
in animals has improved…Second, understanding has improved in cognitive
neuroscience, elucidating how the human brain processes information, particularly
within the cerebral cortex. Convergence between these areas is beginning to enable
us to understand the neurobiological underpinnings of the effects of psychoactive
substances in humans…” (Nutt, 12).
What this passage from 2007 illustrates is the currently developing domain of scientific research
on drug addiction, which has already been an institutionally accepted concept and condition for
one century.
Gabor Maté, while drawn to developments in neuroscience which begin to help explain severe
drug addictions, does not rely on this discourse – given its inability to provide answers – and
moreover, provides a fundamental criticism: “It’s safe to say that any pursuit, natural or artificial,
that induces a feeling of increased motivation and reward—shopping, driving, sex, eating, TV
watching, extreme sports and so on—will activate the same brain systems as drug addictions”
(Maté, 146). In Bruce Alexander’s chapter on “quantitative research and clinical reports,” he also
concludes “…it is difficult [and inconclusive] for clinical researchers to prove why people
become addicted or cling to their addictions” (Alexander, 154).
While the presupposed affects of addiction lack clinical or unequivocal validity, they act as a
tracing23 to enable a ‘legitimized’ identification of addiction. In Addiction and Self-Control, a
synthesis of perspectives from “Philosophy, Psychology, and Neuroscience” based on a
conference in 2010, the absence of clinical certainty led the editor of the essays Neil Levy to

23

“All of tree logic is a logic of tracing and reproduction… Its goal is to describe a de facto state, to
maintain balance in intersubjective relations, or to explore an unconscious that is already there from the start, lurking
in the dark recesses of memory and language. It consists of tracing, on the basis of an overcoding structure or
supporting axis, something that comes ready-made” (A Thousand Plateaus, 12)
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conclude that we still do not fully understand addiction24. Yet, while a clearer understanding in
all forms is needed on addiction, this does not stop Levy from classifying diagnostic critera.
First, as addiction is related to the notion of dependence, which is diagnosed by physical
manifestations of compulsion: “[There is] a wealth of evidence emerging (especially) from
cognitive neuroscience about the ways in which the mechanisms involved in addiction seem to
be different from those engaged in ordinary choice” (Levy, 2). While Levy distinguishes
between addictive (drug-related) and non-addictive ‘losses of control’, both feature a primary
component of addiction: harmfulness. Thus, according to Levy, an addiction is a “failure of selfcontrol,” where “rational agents act contrary to their own best judgments” (ibid). However, Levy
is careful to note that ‘loss of control’ is only “one of the defining features of addiction,” as “loss
of control is also an enormous and growing problem in spheres beyond addiction: obesity,
impulsive spending, failures to save for retirement, and dozens of other behaviors that cause
social and individual problems” (Levy, 1).
Have we lost all sense of what addiction is, or was there no such thing as addiction to begin
with? Given the uncertainty in the presence or locations of addiction, how can we even
differentiate between the addict and the non-addict? The inability of the presupposed notions and
affects to distinguish between addictions and non-addictions has led to an eruption of addictive
classifications, both culturally and institutionally. The DSM-IV features ‘Pathologial Gambling’
as one of the ‘Impulse-Control Disorders Not Elsewhere Classified’: “The essential feature of
Pathological Gambling is persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling behavior (Criterion A)
24

According to the editor Neil Levy, the lack of clarity and certainty surrounding addiction is what compels the text
Addiction and Self-Control to be produced: “This volume is motivated by the belief that understanding addiction,
and loss of self-control more generally, requires a scientifically informed and philosophically sophisticated
perspective on human agency… understanding addiction requires the synthesis or coordination of work on the
subpersonal mechanisms involved in behavior with the personal level at which we understand ourselves. Progress on
these difficult issues will come, therefore, from the interchange between researchers in diverse fields—
neuroscientists, psychologists, and philosophers…” (Levy, 2).

16
that disrupts personal, family, or vocational pursuits” (DSM-IV, 615). While addiction is not
specifically mentioned in the feature, the diagnostic criteria are equivalent to addiction25. The
fifth edition of the DSM now also includes a section on Internet gaming disorder, which “is
included to reflect the scientific literature on persistent and recurrent use of Internet games, and a
preoccupation with them, [which] can result in clinically significant impairment or distress”; and
caffeine use disorder, because “research shows that as little as two to three cups of coffee can
trigger a withdrawal effect marked by tiredness or sleepiness” (DSM V). These eruptions arise
from the problem ‘what is the limit of addiction – where will it stop?’ which is the false problem
resulting from the scientific query ‘what is addiction?’
The inability of the principle of loss of control to explain addiction has left a void which needed
to be filled in order to legitimize the discourse of drug addiction. The absence of clinical
certainty based on the fundamental principle of loss of control in addiction has led many authors
to not only question what addiction is, but also to formulate a new basis for addiction. The
second location of conventional addiction is not within the body, but rather in its relation to a
pursuit – it can be described as the criteria of ‘harmfulness’ of addiction, wherein a compulsive
habit is addictive only as a result of the consequences being perceived as ‘bad’ (harmful). The
‘harmfulness’ discourse of addiction is prevalent in many texts, such as by Gabor Maté:
“The use of substances like heroin, cocaine, nicotine and alcohol are only the most
obvious examples, the most laden with the risk of physiological and medical
consequences. Many behavioural, nonsubstance addictions can also be highly
destructive to physical health, psychological balance, and personal and social
25

“Diagnostic criteria for 312.31 Pathological Gambling: is preoccupied with gambling; needs to gamble with
increasing amounts of money in order to achieve the desired excitement [tolerance]; has repeated unsuccessful
efforts to control, cut back, or stop gambling; is restless or irritable when attempting to cut down or stop gambling
[withdrawal]; has committed illegal acts such as forgery, fraud, theft, or embezzlement to finance gambling; has
jeopardized or lost a significant relationship, job, or educational or career opportunity because of gambling (DSMIV, 618).
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relationships. Addiction is any repeated behaviour, substance-related or not, in which
a person feels compelled to persist, regardless of its negative impact on his life and
the lives of others.” (Maté, 145).
For Bruce Alexander, who distinguishes between four kinds of addictions, the criteria for
locating any of the four addictions (addiction1, addiction2, addiction3 and addiction4) is related
to a logic of ‘harmfulness’. As he enumerates, addiction1 “entails overwhelming involvement
with drug habits, but with no other habits or pursuits”; addiction2 is a “non-overwhelming
involvement,” wherein the ‘addict’ is “self-medicating” or simply “dependent,” such as “on their
jobs, their families, their recreational sports, their cars, their times of prayer or meditation, or on
one or more drugs, in order to carry out their lives in successful ways”; addiction3 is “the set of
overwhelmingly involving, destructive addictions that includes, but goes far beyond, drugs and
alcohol”; whereas “non-destructive addictions will be called addiction4 in this book…These
kinds of addiction are often seen as admirable” (Alexander, 27-56).
In these four conceptions of addiction not only do we see Alexander’s attempt to “finally fulfill
the unredeemed promise of psychology to comprehend the entire spectrum of human motivation,
from the horrors of compulsion to the triumphs of faith and love” (Alexander, 37), but we can
see the domination of the moralistic good/bad binary which characterizes the ‘harmfulness’
model of addiction. While the imposition of an addict who has lost a sense of control does
feature in addiction3 for Bruce Alexander, all of his conceptions of addiction are related to a
criteria of ‘harmfulness’, where addiction is located in its determination of bearing negative
consequences. However, the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction proves to be more than just a
modern rhetorical strategy in discourses of addiction, but rather it was a fundamental component
of the modern creation and conservation of the concept of addiction itself.
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II. The Transformation of Addiction According to a ‘Harmfulness’ Model
The inability of clinical studies to provide conclusive evidence of the presence of addiction is
directly related to the discursive transformation of the concept beginning in the 19th century. The
reclassification of addiction did not occur from laboratory results, but by members of the
religious temperance movement. As such, the two contemporary locations of addiction – in the
body and in the body’s relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour – were produced in the
Protestant discourses of alcohol addiction26, and while they continue to remain fundamental to
discourses of addiction today, it is the reason why clinical science is unable to fill the empirical
void left by the reclassification of addiction.
The Discovery of Addiction by Harry Levine not only traces the principles of addiction back to
their authoritative utterances, but he also does not attempt to answer the scientific question ‘what
is addiction?’ For this reason, Levine’s text is the prototypical discourse on addiction, as it
contributes to the problematization of the concept by illustrating how the principle of a loss of
control and an addiction by relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour were originally
conceived of.
Levine marks the transformation of the concept of addiction not only by referring to the
traditional definition of the word, but more importantly, by illustrating its absence in prior
discourses: “In the colonial period the most common words used to describe the drunkard's
desire for liquor were ‘love’ and ‘affection’, terms seldom used in the 19th and 20th centuries”
(Levine, 5). Moreover, the principle of a loss of control in the drunkard was equally absent:
“During the 17th century, and for most of the 18th, the assumption was that people drank and got
26

“Members of temperance organizations were deeply concerned with the pernicious effects of alcohol on their own
group – primarily the Protestant middle class; they worried about themselves, their relatives, friends and neighbors”
(Levine, 13).
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drunk because they wanted to, and not because they ‘had’ to” (Levine, 4). That many people
liked to drink and get drunk is an unmistakable fact: “Seventeenth-century and especially 18thcentury America was notable for the amount of alcoholic beverages consumed, the universality
of their use and the high esteem they were accorded. Liquor was food, medicine and social
lubricant…” (Levine, 2)27.
And yet, as Levine points out, the absence of a classification of alcohol addiction had much to do
with a relation to a ‘harmfulness’ model of behaviour, meaning that drunkards were tolerated
because they still fulfilled their duties: “In general, drunkards as a group or class of deviants
were not especially problematic for colonial Americans. If they had property, or were able to
support themselves, they were treated much like anyone else of their class” (Levine, 4). This
characterizes one of the main principles of the criteria of ‘harmfulness’, which is that substances
or pursuits which are in accord with the precepts of the ‘good’, ideal body, namely as a producer
and a consumer (but also as a political subject), are not demonized as addictive but promoted as
socially acceptable (as will be addressed in the second chapter).
Before he “clarified for the world the effects of alcohol abuse and gave moral support to those
who saw alcohol as evil” (Deitch, 49)28, the physician (and one of the signers of the Declaration
of Independence) Dr. Benjamin Rush gave acceptance to the social ritual of drunkenness and
only urged moderation: “Have we not seen hundreds who have made it a constant practice to get
drunk almost everyday for thirty or forty years, who, not withstanding, arrived to a great age, and
27

“Workers received a daily allotment of rum, and certain days were set aside for drunken bouts; in some cases,
employers paid for the liquor. The tavern was a key institution in every town, the center of social and political life,
and all varieties of drink were available. Americans drank wine, beer, cider and distilled spirits, especially rum.
They drank at home, at work and while traveling; they drank morning, noon and night. And they got drunk” (Levine,
3).
28
“In 1784, Dr. Benjamin Rush, with a particular interest in mental diseases, wrote “An Inquiry into the Effects of
Spirituous Liquors on the Human Mind and Body,” a scathing account of alcohol’s ill effects…The staunchly
religious Prohibitionist crusaders promoted Dr. Rush’s findings as conclusive evidence — although not many
doctors in those days agreed with all his conclusions” (Deitch, 49).
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enjoyed the same good health as those who have followed the strictest rules of temperance?”
(Rush, 22). Yet despite the general social acceptance of drinking before the temperance
movement became popular, Levine cites examples of a small minority of individuals and groups
who viewed the prevalence and excesses of drinking as highly contemptuous, namely religious
figures29. The seeds of addiction were thus being sewn according to the ‘harmfulness’ model of
addiction, wherein an individual’s immersive habit would be considered an addiction based on
the perceived negative consequences which arose from the pursuit, such as drunkenness being “a
waste of time and of the good creatures of God” (Levine, 3)30. Whereas the groups and
individuals who considered habitual drinking and drunkenness contemptuous, it was their desire
and ability to stop this habit which produced a realization of the drunkard’s “inability” to quit.
Therefore, it was the notion of alcohol addiction as ‘harmful’ which resulted in “terms like
‘overwhelming’, ‘overpowering’ and ‘irresistible’ being used to describe the drunkard's desire
for liquor” (Levine, 5).
The main feature in the transformation of the concept of addiction was propelled by the desire of
a powerful group (temperance members) to eradicate a particular behaviour, in this case,
drunkenness. This very same notion continues today in the differential categorization of what is
addiction and who is addicted. It was the drunkard’s desire to not be coerced into stopping to
drink which produced the idea that there was such a thing as (alcohol) addiction, a disease of the

29

“From time to time some wealthy and powerful colonials complained about excessive drinking and drunkenness.
In 1637 there was concern about "much drunkenness, waste of the good creatures of God, mispense of time, and
other disorders, which took place at taverns." In 1673 Increase Mather published his sermon "Wo to Drunkards"
deploring the frequency of excessive drinking in the colonies. By 1712 things had gotten even worse, and he
reissued his pamphlet…By the 1760s John Adams was so concerned about the level of drunkenness that he proposed
limiting the number of taverns, and Benjamin Franklin labeled taverns ‘a Pest to Society’ (Levine, 3).
30
“Those that follow after Strong Drink, have not the Art of getting or keeping Estates lawfully, Danforth warned in
1710. They cannot be diligent in their Callings, nor careful to improve all fitting Opportunities of providing for
themselves, and for their families” (Levine, 4). This characterization of harmfulness was particularly prescient to the
dominant economic force of the Protestants.
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will or a sense of loss of control31. Meanwhile, it was the work of Dr. Benjamin Rush that
created a new model of habitual drunkenness, one based not only on the location of addiction in
the body, but also based on the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction: “In the bulk of his writings
about alcohol, Rush was not only, or even mainly, concerned with diagnosing the condition of
the drunkard or prescribing cures. He wanted to awaken Americans to an entire catalog of
pernicious results which followed from the consumption of spirits – particularly disease, poverty,
crime, insanity and broken homes” (Levine, 8). Nonetheless, Levine outlines how Benjamin
Rush created the four fundamental principles of the discourse of addiction: “First, he identified
the causal agent – spirituous liquors; second, he clearly described the drunkard's condition as loss
of control over drinking behavior – as compulsive activity; third, he declared the condition to be
a disease; and fourth, he prescribed total abstinence as the only way to cure the drunkard”
(Levine, 8).
It is from these prescriptions traced back to Dr. Rush where we see the origins of the
contemporary discourse of addiction. While developments in clinical studies of psychoactive
drugs have conclusively rejected an inherent addictive nature in drugs (meaning the notion that if
any individual were to ingest drug x they would become addicted, has been rejected), the
temperance discourse of identifying the substance (liquor) as the causal agent of disease and the
cure as being total abstinence has unmistakably led to the contemporary prohibition models of
drugs, such as the Controlled Substances Act. Furthermore, the imposition of habitual
drunkenness as compulsive and a disease also laid the foundation for the contemporary discourse
of addiction as being located strictly in the body. But the latent mechanism of temperance
31

“Of all colonials, Puritan ministers were the most troubled by habitual drunkenness, and in some scattered phrases
and sentences we find evidence of their trying to stretch beyond the ideas of their days. Increase Mather, for
example, declared that habitual drunkenness was a kind of madness, and Foxcroft warned moderate drinkers that
they were ‘in danger of contracting an incurable Habit’” (Levine, 6).
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prohibition lies with the ‘harmfulness’ model of addiction, meaning that a group identifies a
particular behaviour and substance as undesirable (or bad/evil) and moves towards its
eradication, either by force or through discourse. In the case of addiction, its discursive function
materialized by Rush’s “reconstruction of madness as disease,” whereby “within the asylum the
mad could be freed from their chains and taught to constrain themselves” (Levine, 16)32. The
creation of inebriate asylums33, penitentiaries and reformatories illustrates the extent of forceful
coercion that temperance members were willing to go to in order to eradicate habitual
drunkenness34. Today, we see the same model applied to drug addiction: prohibition of the
addictive substance and criminalization of the addict.
Opium Laws and the Further Legitimation of Addiction
While substances of varying uses (medical, recreational, sacramental) have been prohibited and
controlled for centuries, the temperance movement and modern opium relations engendered a
language of addiction that concurrently developed a language of drugs. In the Jiaqing Emperor’s
explanation in 1799 for why opium was being outlawed (again, because the first law proved
32

With the implication of self-control as a fundamental component of modern society, Levine invokes Michel
Foucault, who he says “argues that the establishment of the new view of madness was made possible by the
achievement of economic and political power by the bourgeoisie. Grounded in the optimistic Weltanschauung of the
Enlightenment, the middle class assumed that evil need not exist – social problems were solvable or curable.
However, the conditions of a "free society," meaning individual freedom to pursue one's own interests, required
shifting social control to the individual level. Social order depended upon self-control” (Levine, 16).
33
“In 1838, Samuel B. Woodward, the Superintendent of the famed mental asylum at Worcester, Massachusetts, and
probably the leading American physician concerned with mental health at that time, published a series of articles
describing alcohol addiction as a ‘physical disease’: ‘The appetite is wholly physical, depending on a condition of
the stomach and nervous system, which transcends all ordinary motives of abstinence. The suffering is immense,
and the desire of immediate relief so entirely uncontrollable, that it is quite questionable whether the moral power of
many of its victims is sufficient to withstand its imperative demands’” (Levine, 9-10).
34
“The efforts to develop inebriate asylums were supported by important temperance organizations and leaders.
Benjamin Rush had been the first to recommend a ‘sober house’ where drunkards could get special treatment.
Samuel Woodward also argued strongly for the idea. In 1865 and again in 1867 the Massachusetts Temperance
Alliance issued strong statements of support for the work being done by the Washingtonian home, one of the first
functioning inebriate asylums… In addition, the National Temperance Society published several pamphlets arguing
that asylums were needed because of the very nature of the disease of inebriety. ‘The inebriate is the victim of a
positive disease, induced by the action of an alluring and deceptive physical agent, alcohol’, said one writer, and he
urged that the law provide well-appointed asylums, in which the victims of alcoholic disease can be legally placed,
until ... the disease and morbid appetite are effectually removed” (Levine, 11).
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“unenforceable”) and penalties were being made more severe in China, we will see a language
that mimics the language of addiction that we know today35, but does not refer to addiction
specifically:
“The use of opium originally prevailed only among vagrants and disreputable
persons . . . but has since extended itself among the members and descendants of
respectable families, students, and officers of the government. When this habit
becomes established by frequent repetition, it gains an entire ascendance, and the
consumer of opium is not only unable to forbear from its daily use, but on passing
the accustomed hour, cannot refrain from tears or command himself in any
degree…” (Heyman, 25).
Two things are mutually occurring, analogous to the temperance movement: the behaviour of a
particular group of opium users is held in contempt by an authority – this type of opium user is
eradicated but so is the substance of opium outlawed or heavily controlled. In this instance and
most others, the eradication of the ‘addictive’ behaviour occurs co-dependently with the
prohibition or strict control of the demonized substance.
And yet, the control of a substance and the control of behaviour are two separate bodies: there
are substances which are controlled/prohibited without relation to a type of behaviour, and there
are types of behaviour which are outlawed that have no relation to a substance. As the heretical
psychiatrist Thomas Szasz remarks in Ceremonial Chemistry,
“…let us note carefully just what drug abuse is. Jaffe himself defines it as any
deviation ‘from approved medical or social patterns’ of drug use. We are thus
immediately plunged into the innermost depths of the mythology of mental illness:
for just as socially disapproved pharmacological behavior constitutes ‘drug abuse’,
and is officially recognized as an illness by a medical profession that is a licensed
agency of the state, so socially disapproved sexual behavior constitutes ‘perversion’
and is also officially recognized as an illness…” (Szasz, 9).

35

As Gene Heyman notes, “although the emperor’s observations are more than two hundred years old, his remarks
describe addiction as it is understood today” (Heyman, 25).
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The word addiction is a linguistic symbol of a type of language, the modern discourse of
addiction, whereas the discourse of addiction is an old authoritative form of discourse which has
re-produced a new and highly evocative concept (addiction), as Sarah Graham Mulhall, the
Deputy Commissioner of Narcotics Control of New York City in the 1920s, invokes: “Opium
metamorphises the human soul; it debauches the human will; it entangles the human mind; it
wrecks the human system. The addict ceases to be a voluntary agent; he becomes a slave, a tool,
a victim of his own weakness, and a menace to society” (Mulhall, 605). This description of the
drug and the addict follow an analogous discourse of the temperance movement, where an old
form of a discourse of drugs produced a discourse of addiction. As “around twenty years after its
inception in the Oxford English Dictionary, “the first entry in the OED in which “addiction”
refers to drug use is dated 1906” (Farrell and Redfield, 2), the contemporary coupling of drugs
with addiction can be said to have been engendered by the temperance movement, but facilitated
by former and latter discourses of controlling substances and behaviour.
The fundamental characteristic of addiction and the addict since the temperance movement has
been one of exclusion36: the drug, the drug user and the drug dealer are poisons, physically and
rhetorically – and the determination of these objects as poisonous produces a social necessity for
their eradication. We have seen that the temperance movement was characterized by the
behaviour of habitual drunkards being determined to be socially repulsive, yet it is this social
determination which led to a medical determination of addiction as a disease: the behaviour of
drunkards is abhorred; there is power and authority willing to eradicate it; as it is difficult or

36

Though, as we will see, the subject of exclusion is engendered by the presence of an inclusive space, therefore,
while the subject and object of addiction are excluded, they are also inclusive, either as giving a sense of identity or
being, or by their exclusion within inclusive space – an addict who is prohibited from engaging in his addiction to
heroin is excluded, yet, when he is confined in prison, he is in the inclusive space of the State.
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impossible to reform or coerce the alcoholic into abstention, he appears unable to quit and
becomes a diseased body.
In his book The Addict and the Law, Alfred Lindesmith traces the legal history of opium and
addiction, which for him begins with a tax law: “The Harrison Act of 1914 was passed as a
revenue measure and made absolutely no mention of addicts or addiction…All that [it] clearly
and unequivocally did require was that whatever drug addicts obtained were to be secured from
physicians registered under the act and that the fact of securing drugs be made a matter of
record37” (Lindesmith, 3). While this law illustrates the influence of the medical assemblage
spoken of by Thomas Szasz, where “only the physician is allowed to dispense ‘dangerous drugs’,
[and] if anyone else does so, he is called a ‘pusher’, and is condemned and punished regardless
of the consequences of his efforts” (Szasz, 66), the State imposed itself into the previously
medical (and religious) discourse:
“[citing the Harrison Act] …in the Jin Fuey Moy case of 1920, the Court ruled that a
doctor could not legitimately prescribe drugs ‘to cater to the appetite or satisfy the
craving of one addicted to the use of the drug,’ meanwhile after the Behrman case in
1922 the legal position of the addict seemed quite clear. He was simply denied all
access to legal drugs” (Lindesmith, 6).
The crucial problem for Lindesmith is that the State has imposed itself into the domain of
medicine, where typically the doctor is the practicing authority on how to best treat a patient. Not
only has abstention from drugs proven to work ineffectively in treating addiction, but in contrast,
a regulated dose of the drug helps most in treating addiction and withdrawal38.

37

Because, he says, “previously, drugs were available for purchase in pharmacies and even from mail-order houses”
(Lindesmith, 5).
38
Dr. Charles E. Terry, who had been working with addicts in Jacksonville, Florida, from 1911 until the Harrison
Act went into effect in 1915, said: “After the Act, addicts were treated with rapid withdrawal…I was not prepared
for the extreme suffering which I witnessed in these cases and I realized more than ever that here was indeed a
medical problem and I began to harbor my first doubts as to the wisdom of legislation based upon habit and vice
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The encroachment of the State into the domain of medicine did not go unnoticed in the Supreme
Court, but Lindesmith notes that its dissenting findings have had no practical significance in the
face of control over drugs and the addict. As
“the Linder case dissented from [earlier] cases, it decreed that addiction was a
disease, [and it affirmed] the rule that a physician acting in good faith and according
to fair medical standards may give an addict moderate amounts of drugs to relieve
withdrawal distress without necessarily violating the law.” Once again, “in June 1962
the Supreme Court did again affirm its position in the Robinson v. California case,
by ruling that the California statute which made it a crime to be addicted to the use of
narcotics, was unconstitutional” (Lindesmith, 9-12).
Yet, as Lindesmith remarks, “the federal courts have done next to nothing to restrict their [the
State’s] jurisdiction in narcotic cases in a manner consistent with their own doctrine that disease
is a disease…which leaves the determination of legitimate medical handling of addicts within the
police domain” (Lindesmith, 14). This apparent contradiction is a function of the ‘harmfulness’
model which amounts to a collective enunciation of knowledge and the prohibition and exclusion
of drug addiction. The prescription of ‘harm’ is a material (physical coercion and prohibition)
and linguistic (authority, binary) framework used by authoritative sources to differentiate
between the good and the bad, that which should be included and promoted, and that which
should be excluded and prohibited from the group.
Addiction as a Territorialized Subject and Object
The concept of addiction is situated within a long history of the use and prohibition of sacred
substances. The contemporary notion of ‘recreational drug use’ did not exist in pre-modern
societies that were saturated by the sacred, thus sacred rituals (now considered recreational drug
theories of drug addiction…It would seem unnecessary to state that the narcotic drug addict must be supplied with
his drug in doses physically necessary, and that to supply this drug is not only necessary, but is vital, that to deny it
is to cause a physical and possibly moral wreck, and will ultimately drive the addict to the underworld for their
supply…” (Lindesmith, 23).
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use) and their prohibition, even in contemporary society, follows a historically religious model,
as Jonathan Ott notes in Pharmacotheon: “Although they are disguised as ‘Public Health Laws’,
the strictures against the entheogens are first and foremost limitations on the practice of religion
in a broad sense” (Ott, 22)39. The convergence of Protestantism with economic forces highlights
the main function of the addiction assemblage: the expulsion (a religious function, to be
addressed in the following chapter) of behaviour that does not conform to the dominant
(religious or economic) ideal.
The genocides of European witches40 and American Indians41 reflect historical points of an
ongoing war on sacred rituals in the name of religion and economy:
“Destined to convert the Indians to the ‘Holy Catholic Faith’…on 19 June 1620, the
‘Inquisitors against heresy, depravity and apostasy’ formally decreed in Mexico City
that: ‘The use of the Herb or Root called Peyote ... is a superstitious action and
reproved as opposed to the purity and sincerity of our Holy Catholic Faith, being so
that this said herb, nor any other cannot possess the virtue and natural efficacy
attributed to it for said effects, nor to cause the images, phantasms and
representations on which are founded said divinations…” (Ott, 83-4).
The relation of drug usage and the territorialization of social groups who don’t conform to the
ideal invariably continued into the 20th century, with a seemingly endless list that includes (but
is not limited to) ethnic blacks42, Mexicans and Chinese43.

39

In the introduction to Pharmacotheon, Ott writes: “I use the neologism entheogen{ic) throughout this book, a new
word proposed by a group of scholars including Dr. R. Gordon wasson, Prof. Carl AP. Ruck and me. As we know
from personal experience that shamanic inebriants do not provoke ‘hallucinations’ or ‘psychosis’ and feel it
incongruous to refer to traditional shamanic use of psychedelic plants (that word, pejorativefor many, referring
invariably to sixties' western drug use), we coined this new term in 1979” (Ott, 15).
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“…hundreds of thousands of women were burned, hanged, and tortured in less than two centuries” (Federici,
164).
41
“ …although in 1620 the Inquisition in Mexico formally declared the use of entheogenic plants like péyotl to be a
heresy and the Church vigorously extirpated this use and tortured and executed Indian shamans, ecstasy survives
there even now” (Ott, 60)
42
“In countless lurid stories in the press, the message was driven home that ’cocaine is open the direct incentive to
the crime of rape by the negroes of the South’. Such racist and immoral charges exacerbated racial tensions and led
to numerous lynchings. History again repeated itself in the thirties, as the spectre of marijuana, the ‘Assassin of
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While Jonathan Ott suggests that the violent expulsion of witches was a result of the heresy of
states of ecstacy, Silvia Federici, in Caliban and the Witch Women, invokes the developing
economic landscape as the requisite enemy of the witch, namely that the emerging convergence
between Protestantism and capitalism left magic and pre-modern economic models for dead. In
other words, the Protestant desacralization of the world and the subsequent mechanization of the
body forged the modern principles of a war on drugs, and its corollary concept of addiction. As
Federici notes, “eradicating these practices [of magic] was a necessary condition for the capitalist
rationalization of work, since magic appeared as an illicit form of power and an instrument to
obtain what one wanted without work…and because it undermined the principle of individual
responsibility…” (Federici, 142). Moreover, Federici invokes the seminal work of Max Weber,
by appealing to the notion that “the reform of the body is at the core of the bourgeoisie ethic
because capitalism makes acquisition ‘the ultimate purpose of life’, instead of treating it as a
means for the satisfaction of our needs; thus, it requires that we forfeit all spontaneous enjoyment
of life” (Federici, 135)
The addiction assemblage represents the historical territorialization of individual and collective
bodies which fall outside the moral or economic boundaries imposed by dominant powers.
Therefore, while drunkenness was tolerated by temperance members so long as drunkards were
able to fulfill their economic duty, their ultimate inability to do so meant the failed eradication of

Youth’, a drug then associated with poor Mexican immigrants. was employed to discriminate against Mexicans,
leading to the infamous ‘Marihuana [sic] Tax Act’ of 1937” (Ott, 52).
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“After 1912…the rhetoric coming out of Washington, DC, especially from the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and
suggesting that the Red Chinese were trying to addict America’s youth to heroin, helped create and promote anticommunist hysteria” (Deitch, 66). More importantly, however, is that Deitch notes that “economic conditions have
always been a determining factor in race relations,” namely in the prospect of classifying addiction. Thus, when
“railway owners convinced Congress that they would need to import thousands of less demanding Chinese workers,
the public became angry at the Republican Congress for giving away their jobs… By 1882, anti-Chinese sentiment
forced passage of the Chinese Exclusion Act, prohibiting immigration for ten years. Not surprisingly, America’s
first ‘anti-drug’ laws (early 1880s) were enacted to close the Chinese opium dens that sprang up in and around San
Francisco, which had an enormous Chinese population” (Deitch, 68-9).

29
drunkenness produced the notion of an ‘inability to stop drinking – addiction’. This is situated
within the historical development of the spirit of capitalism – a primarily religious and economic
force. In his text The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Max Weber outlines the
Protestant ‘calling’ of the emergent economic model of capitalism as they dominated and
territorialized traditional social models: “… one’s duty in a calling, is what is most characteristic
of the social ethic of capitalistic culture, and is in a sense the fundamental basis of it. It is an
obligation which the individual is supposed to feel and does feel towards the content of his
professional activity…” (Weber, 19).
Although the convergence between religious and economic forces into a greater assemblage can
be considered a characteristic of pre-modern social models as well, the modern predominance of
the economic is unparalleled. In this respect, as the religious power over the natural world gave
way to an economic power, the social function of inclusion and exclusion based on prescribed
laws (of the good and evil) reflected this transformation: “The old leisurely and comfortable
attitude toward life gave way to a hard frugality in which some participated and came to the top,
because they did not wish to consume but to earn, while others who wished to keep on with the
old ways were forced to curtail their consumption” (Weber, 30). While Weber cautioned that
“one can easily see the limits of the concept of selection as a means of historical explanation,” he
nevertheless conceded that “the capitalism of to-day, which has come to dominate economic life,
educates and selects the economic subjects which it needs through a process of economic
survival of the fittest” (Weber, 20). Thus, we bear witness to the colonization of rituals.
Georges Bataille asserts that the historical production of a surplus was generally followed by its
consumption: “Human sacrifice testifies at the same time to an excess of wealth and to a very
painful way of spending it” (Bataille, 65). Moreover, the Protestant ethic, which developed

30
through the notion of work as an end in itself, also contained the ascetic quality of “a hard
frugality” that territorialized the ritual consumption of the surplus into a ritual of accumulation,
which evidently became a more dominant economic law. Thus, the power over the natural world,
fostered predominantly by religious forces, gave way to the rationalization or capitalization of
rituals.
Addiction and Religion as a Sense of Belonging
In his text on addiction, Thomas Szasz re-considers the addict and addiction as a condition of
inclusion and exclusion, typical of social groups:
“…acceptance or non-acceptance of an identity between ceremonial symbol and
ceremonial referent is a matter of membership in a community, and not a matter of
fact or logic…As the term ’communion’ implies, the celebration of the Lord's Supper
through the Holy Communion at once symbolizes and realizes the joining together,
in a community, of all those who participate in it…The adherents to our majority
religions thus congregate at cocktail parties and ‘smokers’; and have elaborate
ceremonies symbolizing the virtues of mixed drinks and wines, cigars and cigarettes,
pipes and tobaccos, and so forth. These are the holy communions of our age” (Szasz,
39).
Similar to Szasz’s conception of a ritualized sense of belonging, some discourses of addiction,
motivated by the general lack of understanding in the scientific field of addiction, propose an
essence to addiction based on this very sense of belonging. Thus, for the heroin addicts that
Gabor Maté encounters on the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver, their addiction represents “the
only home they’ve ever had” (Maté, 18). Furthermore, Bruce Alexander asserts that “many,
perhaps most, types of addiction actually provide a kind of community or subculture that entails
some real psychosocial gratifications…The importance of addiction-centred communities with
norms, rituals, values, stable social relationships, and certain areas of mutual trust…gives some
sense of belonging…” (Alexander, 164).
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The texts by Maté and Alexander are attempts to answer the scientific question ‘what are the
universal qualities of addiction?’ because, as we have seen, the field of addiction has not
objectively understood the modern concept of addiction, which is ineludibly a response to the
objective claims of universal characteristics made by religious and State lawmakers. Thus,
beyond the physical symptoms and problematic behaviours which signified the earlier
transformation of addiction, a sense of belonging has also been ascribed as a fundamental
characteristic of addiction, as we can also see in Stanton Peele’s text of addiction Love and
Addiction: “Unsure of his own identity, the addict sees other people as objects to serve his
needs…Because he is so vulnerable, what the addict is ideally striving for is perfect
invulnerability. He only gives of himself in exchange for the promise of safety” (Peele, 72-87)
When Thomas Szasz asserts that “medical values have replaced religious values [and] medical
rituals have taken the place of religious rituals” (Szasz, 29)44, he invokes the sense of belonging
that occurs with religious membership, which invariably involves prescriptions of the good and
the evil, thus he writes: “…we oppose illicit drugs not because they are the wrong chemicals but
because they are the wrong ceremonials…” (Szasz, 46). The collective tool of inclusion and
exclusion functions effectively paired with an ideal body (the ideal religious body, the ideal body
of medicine, the ideal body of the state, the ideal body of capital), as Thomas Szasz notes its
presence in the assemblages of drugs and addiction:
“The modern American drug laws have the same social function and same symbolic
significance as had, for example, the dietary laws of the ancient Jews. The aim is still
to be holy, which now means to be healthy; and to be healthy means to take those
drugs prescribed by physicians (rabbis) and to avoid those prohibited by the state
44

Szasz cites theocratic societies and the war against witches, wherein “only the priest was allowed to practice
healing.” For him, the basic principle in these assemblages is the “fundamental law of social organization in general,
and of religious ritual in particular-namely, ‘the conservation and promotion of life’,” which means that “societies
thus seek to include that which they consider good, and to exclude that which they consider evil” (Szasz, 22-29).
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(God). As the dietary rules of the Jews developed the metaphor of holiness on the
lines of prescribed and prohibited foods, so the drug rules of the Americans (and of
other contemporary people) develop the metaphor of healthiness along the lines of
prescribed and prohibited chemicals” (Szasz, 36).
While Szasz contends that to be holy now means to be healthy, which does not sufficiently
account for the non-medical discourses evident in the transition from the temperance movement
into contemporary drug and addiction assemblages, he does recognize the influence of the social
inclusion/exclusion model of drugs and addiction, which stipulates that while some things are
prohibited, others are equally promoted: “Our contemporary drug problems cannot be understood
without paying proper attention to the subtle but powerful tensions between accredited and
unaccredited healers, physicians and quacks, licit and illicit drugs, scientific medicine and folk
medicine” (Szasz, 61)45. For Szasz, this means recognizing the “legitimizing [of] certain drugs
by defining them as not drugs at all, and by encouraging their consumption,” or the aggressive
promotion of “the use, through medical prescriptions, of certain types of new (non-traditional)
mood-affecting drugs” (Szasz, 32)46.
Janet Farrell and Marc Redfield claim that “the addict emerged with the development, a little
more than a century ago, of a medico-legal discourse capable of reconceiving human identity in
the language of pathology” (Farrell and Redfield, 2), but they do not account for the religious
and economic components of the assemblages of drugs and addiction. The following chapter will
further investigate the convergence of a religious function with State and capitalist assemblages,
necessarily as it relates to addiction in the form of social inclusion/exclusion (which, in the next
45

While Szasz articulates his discourse on drugs through the presence of the medical assemblage and alcohol as the
prototypical modern ceremonial, he does not account for other assemblages with their own ideal bodies. For
instance, he writes “The plain historical facts are that before 1914 there was no "drug problem" in the United States;
nor did we have a name for it” (Szasz, 11). Clearly, Szasz does not apply the temperance movement to his discourse
on drugs and addiction.
46
As we will note in the third chapter, Richard Degrandpre refers to the discursive relation to the pharmaceutical
industry as pharmacologicalism.
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chapter, will be identified as a primarily religious function based on Mircea Eliade’s conception
of the sacred). As we will see, the subject of addiction belongs as a profane ritual in the sacred
space of the State and capitalism, wherein sacred rituals ensure inclusion within sacred space,
and where profane rituals materialize through the creation of the sacred. More importantly, we
will investigate the similarities between the sacred rituals of sports and the profane rituals of
addiction.
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Chapter 2
Profane Addictions in a Sacred World: the sports fanatic as drug addict
Following Deleuze and Guattari’s distinction between a major and minor language, a discourse
on addiction delineates the ‘accepted as truth’ function of addiction, which is presupposed and
applied in the majority language of discourses of addiction (such as were invoked in the first
chapter – DSM-V, CSA, Gabor Maté): “Majority assumes a state of power and domination, not
the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around…Minor
languages do not exist in themselves: they exist only in relation to a major language and are also
investments of that language for the purpose of making it minor” (A Thousand Plateaus, 1045)47.
In the first chapter, we stated the currently accepted principles of addiction alongside a trace of
historical discourses that contributed to the modern transformation of the concept in order to
draw attention to authoritative rationalizations of social and individual control. What emerged
was a question (‘what are the scientific characteristics of addiction?’) founded on a false
problematic: the moralistic categorization of principles of addiction prevents a sufficiently
scientific concept. In other words, while addiction masquerades as a scientific truth, it was
transformed (from its pre-modern signification) and sustained by moralistic religious and state

47

“It is a question not of reterritorializing oneself on a dialect or a patois but of deterritorializing the major language.
Black Americans do not oppose Black to English, they transform the American English that is their own language
into Black English. Minor languages do not exist in themselves: they exist only in relation to a major language and
are also investments of that language for the purpose of making it minor. One must find the minor language, the
dialect or rather idiolect, on the basis of which one can make one's own major language minor…having to conquer
one's own language, in other words, to attain that sobriety in the use of a major language, in order to place it in a
state of continuous variation (the opposite of regionalism)…Conquer the major language in order to delineate in it as
yet unknown minor languages. Use the minor language to send the major language racing... Majority implies a
constant, of expression or content, serving as a standard measure by which to evaluate it…Majority assumes a state
of power and domination, not the other way around. It assumes the standard measure, not the other way around.” (A
Thousand Plateaus, 104-5)
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authorities48. Thus, when Nietzsche asks ‘what is a truth?’ and ‘what is good and bad?’ he
rightfully implicates the power which ineludibly fosters knowledge: “The right of the master to
give names extends so far that we could permit ourselves to grasp the origin of language itself as
an expression of the power of the rulers: they say ‘that is such and such’, seal every object and
event with a sound and, in the process, as it were, take possession of it” (Genealogy of Morals,
2)49.
Based on the discourses of addiction from the first chapter, it is our contention that the
authorities which have prescribed a universal or natural condition of addiction have been
primarily a religious, State or capitalist power. While the first chapter evinced a discourse of
addiction that was mostly prohibitive in nature, it must also be noted that the movement of
control and prohibition of substances and behaviours occurs interdependently with a promoted
ideal, whether it is medical (healthy, sane), religious (Protestant), racial, economic (capitalist), or
state (law-abiding). Therefore, these territorializing assemblages not only resist the behaviours
which they deem immoral, but they also create and promote their own ideal behaviours. Thus,
the power over determining social morals controls and produces behaviours which sustain or
reaffirm that power. In this respect, the question which emerges out of the first chapter is

48

“If someone hides something behind a bush, looks for it in the same place and then finds it there, his seeking
and finding is nothing much to boast about; but this is exactly how things are as far as the seeking and finding of
'truth' within the territory of reason is concerned. If I create the definition of a mammal and then, having inspected a
camel, declare, 'Behold, a mammal', then a truth has certainly been brought to light, but it is of limited value, by
which I mean that it is anthropomorphic through and through and contains not a single point which could be said to
be 'true in itself', really and in a generally valid sense, regardless of mankind” (The Birth of Tragedy and Other
Writings, 147)
49
What, from an etymological perspective, do the meanings of ’Good’ as manifested in different languages really
mean? There I found that all of them lead back to the same transformation of ideas, that everywhere ‘noble’ or
‘aristocratic’ in a social sense is the fundamental idea out of which ‘good’ in the sense of ‘spiritually noble’,
‘aristocratic’, ‘spiritually high-minded’, ‘spiritually privileged’ necessarily develop—a process which always runs in
parallel with that other one which finally transforms ‘common’, ‘vulgar’, and ‘low’ into the concept ‘bad’.”
(Genealogy of Morals, 8)
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whether these moralistic prescriptions take on the form of the religious, and moreover, how this
contributes to a discourse on addiction.
In his text The Sacred and the Profane, Mircea Eliade’s conception of the religious and sacred
rituals offers an effective model with which to not only delineate the principles of addiction, but
also to forward the notion of moralistic prescriptions of the good and the bad as being a
characteristically religious function which the territorializing powers of the modern State and
capitalism have appropriated. The limitation of Eliade’s distinction between the sacred and the
profane reflects the mechanism which transformed and sustains the concept of addiction, which
is formed from a prescribed ideal (the sacred) and its opposite (the profane). As Eliade attempts
to form a universal essence of the sacred, he misses the ostensible function of the religious: to
create and sustain the sacred through which the profane is engendered. If, beyond Eliade’s
notion, the religious is conceived of as an epistemological and ontological power of creation over
the sacred and profane, then the supposedly scientific principles of addiction can be re-situated
as moral judgments and, moreover, the determination of addiction as a profane ritual can be
contrasted with sacred rituals. Therefore, the discussion of Eliade’s texts will address the concept
of addiction as materializing from moral authorities, which gives a sense of belonging through
ideals that must be ritualized.
The proceeding section will encounter the sacred ritual of sport and the sports fanatic as a
prospective subject of addiction. Much as addiction (as a concept and its materializations)
underwent drastic territorializations by religious, State and capitalist authorities, so too have
sports become an object of conquest. In this respect, we can see how the territorialization of
sports (as a ritual) has conformed to the ideals of these authorities. Moreover, as characteristics
of the sports fanatic will be shown to contain elements of addiction, this further implicates the
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moral authorities which have desacralized rituals based on the physiological and self-destructive
components discourse of addiction, and have sacralized rituals which not only display these same
components, but at times to an even worse degree. To effectively evoke these components in the
sports fanatic, we rely on the endless supply of discussions from online sports forums.
I. Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane in Addiction
At the end of the first chapter, we invoked discourses of addiction which claim that an addiction
is a ritualization that gives an addict a social sense of belonging or identity50. For Thomas Szasz,
these ritualizations imitate or embody religious rituals, and moreover, Szasz infers that
contemporary sources of authority (such as agents of law or medicine) have overtaken the
prescriptive power over rituals previously held by religious authorities. Consequently, he says
“our contemporary drug problems cannot be understood without paying proper attention to the
subtle but powerful tensions between accredited and unaccredited healers, physicians and
quacks, licit and illicit drugs, scientific medicine and folk medicine” (Szasz, 61). To pay
attention to these tensions, as Szasz says, is to trace the distinction between ‘good’ and ‘bad’
rituals to their authoritative utterance in the form of moral laws.
When Nietzsche concluded that there is nothing naturally ‘true’, ‘good’ or ‘bad’ beyond their
anthropomorphic significations, he cast a light of inquiry onto the voices of authority which hold
power over the manifestation of these concepts. In contrast, in his texts The Sacred and the
Profane, Mircea Eliade asserts that there is a real (natural or universal) difference between the
modern nonreligious man and his religious ancestors based on a real difference between the
sacred and the profane. While according to Eliade modern man embodies the profane, it is our
50

The notion from the first chapter that an addiction provides a sense of belonging or membership to a group comes
from several authors, including Bruce Alexander, Thomas Szasz, Stanton Peele and Gabor Maté – each author,
however, described this sense in their own terms.
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contention that, based on Eliade’s own conception of the sacred, State and capitalist rituals
actually embody the sacred. Therefore, despite Eliade’s presupposition of a reality where there is
an objective difference between religious man and nonreligious man, his texts provide a
framework for a concept of the religious as containing a power over the creation of the sacred
(and thus the profane), which contributes to the delineation of the concept of addiction as moral
prescription.
According to Eliade, “…the sacred is pre-eminently the real, at once power, efficacity, the
source of life and fecundity” (Sacred and Profane, 28). While this conception of the sacred is
constructive because it theorizes a higher power which gives the subject life (social identity),
Eliade elaborates a further conception of the sacred which eventually leads him to desacralize
religious man from nonreligious man:
“Whatever the historical context in which he is placed, homo religiosus always
believes that there is an absolute reality, the sacred, which transcends this world but
manifests itself in this world, thereby sanctifying it and making it real. He further
believes that life has a sacred origin and that human existence realizes all of its
potentialities in proportion as it is religious – that is, participates in reality” (Sacred
and Profane, 202).
For Eliade, the function of belief is paramount to achieving the sacred, given that the ‘right’ kind
of belief is what separates religious man from nonreligious man: “Modern nonreligious man
assumes a new existential situation…he refuses transcendence, accepts the relativity of ‘reality’,
and may even come to doubt the meaning of existence…he only makes himself completely in
proportion as he desacralizes himself and the world” (Sacred and Profane, 203).
In this respect, the separation of the sacred from the profane is crucial for Eliade: “the first
possible definition of the sacred is that it is the opposite of the profane (Sacred and Profane,
10).” The basis for Eliade’s distinction is his belief in ‘the real’, ‘true reality’, and ‘objective

39
reality’, wherein the experience of the profane is outside of ‘true reality’: “Revelation of a sacred
space makes it possible to obtain a fixed point and hence to acquire orientation in the chaos of
homogeneity, to ‘found the world’ and to live in a real sense. The profane experience, on the
contrary, maintains the homogeneity and hence the relativity of space” (Sacred and Profane, 23).
A problem arises when Eliade elaborates on the opposition between sacred and profane rituals:
“Since ‘our world’ is a cosmos, any attack from without threatens to turn it into
chaos… An attack on ‘our world’ is equivalent to an act of revenge by the mythical
dragon, who rebels against the work of the gods, the cosmos, and struggles to
annihilate it. ‘Our’ enemies belong to the powers of chaos. Any destruction of a city
is equivalent to a retrogression to chaos. Any victory over the attackers reiterates the
paradigmatic victory of the gods over the dragon (that is, over chaos)” (Sacred and
Profane, 47-8).
Eliade takes this line of thought further by sacralizing the ritual conquest and colonization:
“Whether it is a case of clearing uncultivated ground or of conquering and occupying
a territory already inhabited by ‘other’ human beings, ritual taking possession must
always repeat the cosmogony. For in the view of archaic societies everything that is
not ‘our world’ is not yet a world. A territory can be made ours only by creating it
anew, that is, by consecrating it”51 (Sacred and Profane, 32).
Eliade’s opposition of the profane to the sacred reflects the territorializing aspects of the
religious and the sacred – they are done in the name of God. If sacred or religious authorities
control the natural world (or its territories), then their prescription of sacred rituals form an
illusion of choice (such as the one created in the sacred world of capitalism – modern man still
follows the hierarchization of religious rituals, only it occurs under the illusion of choice and
variety).

51

Eliade’s sacralization of ritual conquest and colonization is based on his stance on the ‘goodness’ of the sacred:
“To settle in a territory is, in the last analysis, equivalent to consecrating it. When settlement is not temporary, as
among the nomads, but permanent, as among sedentary peoples, it implies a vital decision that involves the
existence of the entire community” (Sacred and Profane, 34).
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Eliade’s concept of the sacred begins to complexify with his relation of beliefs to rituals.
Religious rituals, or hierophanies, create and recreate the sacred world: “What is to become ‘our
world’ must first be ‘created’, and every creation has a paradigmatic model — the creation of the
universe by the gods” (Sacred and Profane, 31) As Eliade prescribes sacred rituals a power to
create ‘true reality’ (and escape the profane world), he highlights their crucial presence in premodern religious men: “we might say that the archaic world knows nothing of ‘profane’
activities: every act which has a definite meaning hunting, fishing, agriculture; games, conflicts,
sexuality, in some way participates in the sacred…The rest of his life is passed in profane time,
which is without meaning” (Cosmos and History, 27) While the functional role of rituals will
become more relevant in relation to an upcoming discussion on rituals of addiction and
capitalism, the divergence between two principles of Eliade’s sacred must be addressed – the
sacred which creates and the sacred which believes.
For this, we return once again to Nietzsche, who traces the distinction between the good and the
evil to a moral difference of ritualization: “The ‘pure man’ is from the start simply a man who
washes himself, who forbids himself certain foods which produce diseases of the skin, who
doesn’t sleep with the dirty women of the lower people…” (Genealogy of Morals, 10). Thus, we
find that rituals, being a highly functional component of re-creating the sacred, are a battlefield
on which sacred wars take place. Furthermore, the greater power will possess the territory for
proclaiming the sacred.
While according to Eliade the sacred is saturated with ‘true reality’, we are more concerned with
Eliade’s conception of the creative function of religiosity, which “founds the world in the sense
that it fixes the limits and establishes the order of the world” (Sacred and Profane, 30). In the
context of capitalism, the hierarchization of the sacred model of creation engenders the
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prescription and prohibition of our present day rituals. There is little doubting the fact that
capitalism and the State hold significant territorial power over the natural world, and that they
account for a significant portion of the limits and order of the natural world.
That capitalist and State assemblages behave like a sacred group can be illustrated by analogous
mechanisms of territorialization by coercive social inclusion/exclusion: “…part of the structure
of corporate capitalism is that the players in the game try to increase profits and market shares—
if they don’t do that, they will no longer be players in the game” (Chomsky, 26). Max Weber
also noted the exclusionary function of capitalism: “The manufacturer who in the long run acts
counter to (these) norms, will just as inevitably be eliminated from the economic scene as the
worker who cannot or will not adapt himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a
job” (Weber, 19).
In other terms, the contemporary persecution of drugs, drug users and drug dealers, by
authoritative members of religion, State or capitalism follows Eliade’s model of religion and the
sacred. For instance, we may compare the treatment of cannabis sativa (illegal) and tobacco
(legal) according to the morals and rituals of the capitalist religion, as Noam Chomsky does:
“It can’t be because of the health impact, because that’s exactly the other way
around—there has never been a fatality from marijuana use among 60 million
reported users in the United States, whereas tobacco kills hundreds of thousands of
people every year. My strong suspicion … is that the reason is that marijuana’s a
weed; you can grow it in your backyard, so there’s nobody who would make any
money off it if it were legal. Tobacco requires extensive capital inputs and
technology, and it can be monopolized, so there are people who can make a ton of
money off it. I don’t really see any other difference between the two of them,
frankly—except that tobacco’s far more lethal and far more addictive” (Chomsky,
49).
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Furthermore, the drunkard, the witch, the American Indian, the Chinese, the junkie, and the
Black man all posed a threat to a sacred world, with its own sacred rituals which are considered
‘pure’, in contrast to the impurity of the profane. Here we refer once again to Thomas Szasz’s
recognition that authorities “…oppose illicit drugs not because they are the wrong chemicals but
because they are the wrong ceremonials…” (Szasz, 46).
As Eliade asserts that modern spaces are typically saturated by the profane, it is our contention
that they are instead a different form of ritualized sacred space, and that traditional gods have
been supplanted by State and capitalist creators. Moreover, while capitalist rituals reflect the
sacred space which it has territorialized, and oppose rituals of addiction (making them profane
rituals), the sacred is a concept with an illusory continuity, meaning that rituals of addiction are
not necessarily religious rituals – they only perform ritualistically. A more salient point, in
regards to addiction, is that while in modern society we may focus our problematization on the
mechanism of the profane, it is equally critical to recognize the sacralization of spaces, subjects
and objects by the State or capitalist assemblages. In other words, there are sacred state and
sacred capitalist rituals, such as gambling, drinking alcohol or smoking cigarettes, and there are
forms of the profane, such as heroin, cannabis sativa, or idleness.
The Economy of Drugs
By invoking the conception of addiction from the DSM and Controlled Substances Act in the
previous chapter, the fundamental association between drugs and addiction was illustrated – the
relation between alcohol and the drunkard, or of opium to the opium addict precipitated complete
abstinence and prohibition of these substances. While the use of alcohol and opium was viewed
as the causal source of an insatiable craving, it was also unknown as to why it afflicted some but
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not others, a question which persists today52. As abstinence from alcohol was prescribed only for
addicts (and temporarily for all), non-addicts could still obtain and use the substance. Today, in
North America, alcoholics and non-alcoholics can obtain alcohol. Opium, however, cannot be
obtained without a prescription from an authorized physician, and as Lindesmith noted in his text
The Addict and the Law, addiction to opium is not an acceptable condition for receiving opium.
While discourses of drugs and addiction rationalize the prohibition of illicit substances through
logics of harmfulness, they veil the relation of the profane ritual to State or capitalist principles.
The criteria of harmfulness which rationalized prohibition can be observed to be strikingly
contradictory, such as in the above comparison between cannabis sativa and tobacco. Moreover,
according to the Controlled Substances Act of the U.S.A., marijuana is a substance with “a high
potential for abuse…which may lead to severe psychological or physical dependence,” wherein
it is “essential that the United States cooperate with other nations in establishing effective
controls over international traffic in such substances” (Controlled Substances Act). And yet,
clinical studies are unequivocal in their determination of the negative health effects of tobacco53,
while Schedule I drugs such as marijuana have shown comparatively negligible harms.
While people can be subjected to medical categories of normal or sick, these categories are
subsumed and propelled by higher ideals, such as profit: “It costs in the order of $1 billion and
takes 10 years to develop and approve a drug…The market for treatments for addiction is small
and there is a potential for stigma to be attached to any business that might develop treatments
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“Genomics is helping us to identify why certain groups of people are at greater or lesser risk of harm from
recreational drugs, or of becoming addicted to them, than others” (Nutt, 2).
53
“Apart from caffeine, which is the most used psychoactive substance but is rarely associated with serious harm,
alcohol and tobacco are the main legal drugs. In the UK, alcohol is associated with 22 000 premature deaths a year,
30 000 hospital admissions and 50% of violent crime. Harm associated with alcohol costs the UK economy about
£20 billion per year. Smoking is in decline in the UK but is associated with a fifth of all deaths, 106 000 per year,
and a third of all cancers” (Nutt, 3).
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for illicit drugs” (Nutt, 3). In a text sponsored by the UK government, several authors, including
David Nutt, profess to the medicalization of sacred substances and the imposition of the religious
function onto recreational drugs, which represents the twin axis of drugs and addiction. First,
with the territorialization of the promoted ideal:
“There is a large unmet need for medicines for mental health… We have already
seen excessively active children diagnosed as having ADHD (attention deficit
hyperactivity disorder), and excessively shy people being diagnosed as having social
anxiety disorder. Effective treatments have been made available for both conditions”
(Nutt, 2).
This approach by the state-authorized medical assemblage illustrates a religious relationship
between drugs and addiction: a differentiation between “normal life” and “mental health
conditions” facilitates a control over what are considered to be medicines (those which put the
subject back onto the path of normal life) and poisons (those which put the subject into a
condition of medical pathology, such as addiction).
Besides the determination of what is good and sacred, there is an accompanying territorialization
of what is a poison, typically associated with death, disease, crime or economics:
“The current economic and social costs of illicit drug use to the UK are in the order
of £13 billion a year. Crime accounts for most of this cost. Health harms are also
significant, with an estimated 350 000 problem drug users in the UK. Many of these
are injecting users and are at risk of transmitting hepatitis C and HIV infections”
(Nutt, 3).
While Thomas Szasz remarks that the medical assemblage has replaced the religious assemblage
in terms of sacred rituals, this does not account for recreational rituals which are sacralized, such
as alcohol, tobacco, caffeine, gambling, television, sports, etc. The problem in differentiating
between ‘what is healthy?’ and ‘what is harmful?’ represents the false problematic which
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obscures the intent of a (state-sponsored and economically-driven) medical assemblage, which is
social control according to higher ideals, as it begs the question ‘what is sacred in our world?’
A dominant mechanism of assemblages of drugs and addiction incorporates not only the
prohibition and demonization of substances and behaviours, but also the idealization and
promotion of others. Therefore, a powerful State or capitalist assemblage subsumes both drugs
and addiction into a prescribed ideal, in which one is either an included or excluded member. Of
course, this does not encompass the totality of how the territorialized body is produced, but it
does offer a trace of how an assemblage is sustained: social, material and semiotic production,
consumption, and exclusion. And yet, the emergence of the capitalist assemblage into addiction
reflects the complimentary nature of inclusivity and exclusivity: while the majority of capitalist
subjects are producers and consumers, the minority exists on the fringes, such as in prisons or
homelessness.
That the affects of addiction go beyond the conventional linguistic limits imposed on it is
exemplified by the capitalist body. In the capitalist assemblage, addiction has become a selfidentifying norm (and its ‘positive’ discourse is flowering): “I’m addicted to food…I’m addicted
to television…I’m addicted to the internet...I’m a gym addict…I’m a sports addict…I’m addicted
to sex…I’m addicted to chocolate…I’m addicted to video games…I’m addicted to Ritalin…I’m
addicted to buying things…I’m addicted to collecting things…I’m addicted to money…” Most
of these affects of addiction do not carry the negative (a need for suppression) label of addiction,
but are points of pride for the identity of the subject: ‘workaholic’, ‘gym rat’, ‘collector’,
‘entrepreneur’, ‘gamer’, ‘sports fan’, are discursive examples of how the capitalist machine has
inclusively re-signified the addiction affect, but yet still maintains the traditional functionality of
the subject’s inclusion/exclusion within the medical, capitalist, state or addiction assemblage.
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Therefore, the ‘non-addict’ is not a body that lacks the addictive affects, but rather incarnates the
ideal State or capitalist body. Moreover, we can say that capitalism and the State apply the
religious function of the creation of sacred time, space and rituals, with their accompanying
profane counterparts: “Remember, that time is money…Remember, that money is of the prolific,
generating nature. Money can beget money, and its offspring can beget more, and so on…”
(Weber, 15).
At stake here is the presupposed continuum54 of addiction constituted by the presupposed
absence of addiction (or its affect) in the sacred body of the State and capitalism. This ‘problem’
can be approached from the fallacy of making such a categorization, based on the dependence of
the utterance on authority (and not as an objective truth), but also from the inability of the
concept (of ‘addiction’) to contain its self-inscribed parameters/limits. How broad is the
“continuum” spoken of addiction? It is being made to believe that what is conventionally
considered to be addiction is a physiological and/or harmful condition, whereas that which is not
addiction lacks these affects. These notions of the fundamental characteristics of addiction are
thus being put under question in the form of a contrast to the sacred rituals of the State and
capitalism, specifically, sports fanaticism.
II. The Sports Fanatic As Drug Addict
“CanuckUKinToronto: Outside of what I do for money, other than direct family, Leafs/hockey is
my world.... or so the wife tells me when i dont miss any games and always on this site.”
What is the consequence of capitalism or the State being conceived of as a religious source?
According to Eliade, this means it “founds the world in the sense that it fixes the limits and
establishes the order of the world” (Sacred and Profane, 30). More importantly, however, is that
54

See In the Realm of Hungry Ghosts, by Gabor Maté, pages 11, 78, 134, and notably 193.
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those who live within sacred space conform to the prescribed sacred and profane rituals, wherein
the profane rituals that are opposed to the sacred rituals are legitimated by moral authority and
not by scientific truth – which is the primary basis of the legitimation of the concept of addiction.
In other words, the choice between being addicted to alcohol, caffeine, tobacco, or the gym is a
choice between sacred rituals (those which are morally promoted), whereas the profane rituals
(which are morally prohibited, and in this case, imbued with a naturalistic evil essence) would
situate oneself outside of sacred reality (following Eliade’s conception of the sacred)55. Yet, that
the profane is only a moral idea engendered by the sacred is reflected in the fact that when a
junkie is confronted by the State for using heroin and is confined for his profane use of a profane
substance, he nevertheless remains within the sacred territory of the prison. Eliade’s conception
of the sacred as containing essential elements of reality (and thus to be in the profane is to be
outside of reality) fails to address the anthropomorphic cause behind the creation of the sacred
world. Therefore, in relation to Eliade, the authoritative creation of sacred space can be viewed
as an eminent religious function, characteristics which capitalist and State assemblages conform
to.
For a discourse on addiction the notion of the religious function, which materializes from
Eliade’s texts, reiterates Nietzsche’s investigation into the origins of “good and evil”: the essence
of addiction as it has been prescribed, as a natural/scientific concept, was formed by the religious
function – as an authoritative moral distinction. If the prohibition of péyotl, cannabis sativa,
heroin, or any other restricted substances – rationalized by, among the reasons, a proclivity to
addiction – represent the profane, then sports represent one of the more popular sacred rituals.
55

This illusion of choice is elaborated by Deleuze and Guattari in their distinction between the majority and the
minority: “A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered minoritarian, by nature
and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an outsystem. This is evident in all the operations,
electoral or otherwise, where you are given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the limits of
the constant ("you mustn't choose to change society...’)” (A Thousand Plateaus, 105).
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While we have already drawn attention to the contradictory differential prohibition of cannabis
sativa in contrast to the promotion of tobacco56, sports offer a new discourse from which to
delineate the concept of addiction (discourses of addiction surrounding tobacco and gambling
have grown increasingly in recent times). Moreover, online sports forums, on which sports
fanatics congregate to exchange messages and ideas, offers an attractive selection of discourses
from which to incorporate into a discourse on addiction.
The Colonization of Sports
Are sports a sacred ritual? In Football as World-View and as Ritual, Christian Bromberger
wavers between the fact that sports engage a ritualistic behaviour, but “contrary to a religious
system, football matches and the fervour they arouse do not form an autonomous and coherent
body of representations, beliefs and practices…We usually expect a ritual to remind us of the
ultimate meaning of existence, to tell us about the next world, to assure us of our salvation…”
(Bromberger, 310). While Bromberger is concerned with a “transcendent” content to religion and
rituals, based on the preceding section on Eliade’s The Sacred and the Profane, we focus on their
primary functions: having the power to create a sacred world and sustain it. Thus, while
Bromberger enumerates the ritualistic qualities of football, specifically as they relate to
characteristics of religious rituals, it is the football ritual as a capitalist spectacle of the sports
fanatic which is most intriguing:
“Every match between rival towns, regions and countries takes the form of a
ritualized war, complete with anthems, military fanfares and banners wielded by fans
who make up the support divisions and who even call themselves ’brigades’,
’commandos’, ’legions’ and ’assault troops’…[and] it is often those towns 56

The prohibition of marijuana is rationalized based on a model of medicine; the far worse negative health effects of
tobacco – not to mention rates of addiction – reflect the dubiousness of the conceptualization of drugs as dangerous
or addictive.
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Liverpool, Marseilles, Naples – which have fallen on bad times, that in their
nostalgic yearning for past glories, are most passionate about the clubs that represent
them, as if the team’s exploits will dress and heal their current wounds”
(Bromberger, 302).
Bromberger draws a link between the function of the sports ritual and greater social forces,
where for instance “…in Italy under the Fascists, as in Argentina under the military junta, the
national team’s successes were exploited as propaganda,” however, this notion is not elaborated
any further beyond sports rituals functioning to “blur people’s perception of their place in society
and of their everyday problems, both as individuals and as a group…” (Bromberger, 294). Yet,
as we will see, modern sports engage participants in a ritual that is overcoded57 by the State and
capitalism.
In Sport Matters, Eric Dunning traces the development of sports to a time when they were not
territorialized by the modern State or capitalism, an event which, according to Dunning,
proliferated in England – as such, he traces the modern form of football (and rugby) to “a type of
medieval folk game…with locally specific oral rules… played in ways which involved levels of
violence that were considerably higher than would be permitted in soccer, rugby and comparable
games today”58 (Dunning, 50). Dunning goes on to claim that the development of modern sport
occurred within the climate of State and economic forces, as
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‘Overcoded’ is a term from Deleuze and Guattari: “What begins with the State or the apparatus of capture is a
general semiology that overcodes the primitive semiotic systems. Instead of traits of expression that follow a
machinic phylum and wed it in a distribution of singularities, the State constitutes a form of expression that
subjugates the phylum: the phylum or matter is no longer anything more than an equalized, homogenized, compared
content, while expression becomes a form of resonance or appropriation” (A Thousand Plateaus, 444-5).
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“Modern soccer and rugby are descended from a type of medieval folk games which, in Britain, went by a variety
of names such as ‘football’, ‘camp ball’, ‘hurling’ and ‘knappan’…They were played by variable, formally
unrestricted numbers of people, sometimes in excess of a thousand. There was no equalization of numbers between
sides, and the rules were oral and locally specific rather than standardized, written and enforced by a central body.
Despite such local variation, the games in this folk tradition shared at least one feature: they were play struggles
which involved the customary toleration of forms of physical violence which have now been tabooed and were
generally played in ways which involved levels of violence that were considerably higher than would be permitted
in soccer, rugby and comparable games today” (Dunning, 50).
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“the initial development of modern sport was a process which occurred…principally
in two main, overlapping stages: a stage in the eighteenth century when members of
the aristocracy and gentry were predominant; and a stage in the nineteenth century
when members of ascendant bourgeois groups joined the landed classes in taking the
lead” (Dunning, 53); forces which developed interdependently: “It was in the context
of an increasingly pacified society subject to more effective forms of parliamentary
rule that recognizably modern forms of sport based upon written rules first began to
emerge” (Dunning, 56).
While at one point Dunning poses the question of sports as a problem of the individual (as an
object of sociological study), he highlights the fact that for centuries “unsuccessful attempts were
made by state and local authorities to ban (these) wild games” (Dunning, 51). The crucial point is
that Dunning had traced modern football (and rugby) to epochs that were absent of a major
presence of “state and local authorities,” and, moreover, that the modern game of football is now
saturated with the effects of a “civilizing process,”59 a concept which Norbert Elias formed to
account for an increasingly visible progression in the transformation of social rituals towards
what he terms ‘the civilized’ – which invariably implicates the State and economic forces which
emerged at the same time. A conclusion we draw from the aforementioned texts by Dunning and
Bromberger is that modern sports represent a sacred State and sacred capitalist ritual.
Bromberger and Dunning each argue, in their own terms, that sports embody the forms of
religious rituals. More importantly, however, is the transformation of the function of sports into a
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Dunning notes that the transformation of sport into modern games was “more a function of wider social
developments, especially of the peculiarly English variants of the state-formation and civilizing processes…”
(Dunning, 53). Dunning uses the concept “civilizing process” based on Norbert Elias’ text The Civilizing Process,
wherein Elias wanted to account for “the elaboration and refinement of manners and socially required standards of
behaviour; increasing social pressure on people to exercise an even measure of all-round self-restraint over their
feelings and behaviour, that is regarding all aspects of bodily functions and in more and more social situations; a
shift in the always socially necessary balance between external constraints and self-constraints in favour of selfconstraints; an advancing threshold of repugnance regarding bodily functions such as eating, drinking, defecation,
urination, sex and sleeping, a process in terms of which these functions and the connected bodily organs came to be
increasingly laden with taboos and surrounded by feelings of anxiety, embarrassment, guilt and shame; an advancing
threshold of repugnance regarding engaging in and even witnessing violent acts; and, as a corollary of this generally
advancing threshold of repugnance, a tendency to push violence and acts connected with biological functions
increasingly ‘behind the scenes’” (Dunning, 44).
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capitalist or State ritual. Both of these conclusions can also be drawn from Sports, Culture and
the Media by David Charles Rowe, who traces a historical function of sports, wherein he says the
development of the role of media in sports is unmistakable60: “By the second decade of the
twentieth century, ‘Spectator sport was [now] attracting massive crowds’, especially of workingclass men. On this basis, a whole economy of sport developed” (Rowe, 21)61. Furthermore,
Rowe draws a link between sacred rituals and capitalist rituals: “If sport and religion have certain
qualities in common, they also share an involvement with business, especially where the religion
is, as Max Weber pointed out, the Calvinist form of Protestantism…” (Rowe, 72). In this respect,
Rowe supports our contention that the rituals of sports have become overcoded by capitalist and
State assemblages: “Once elements of sport had become rationalized and industrialized, they
necessarily entered into relations with other economic entities that acted as conduits, carrying
sports culture far beyond its places of origin” (Rowe, 24). While the discourses of Bromberger
and Dunning evoke the territorialization of sports rituals beyond simply technological ones, as
Rowe suggests, the technological development which has enveloped the spectacle of sports has
occurred primarily through State and economic forces:
“With the development of national and international sporting competitions, the
maturation of media advertising and the emergence of broadcast media for which
there was no or limited direct payment by the ‘consumer’, new revenue streams and
uses of the sports media were created. In this way, the media sports text became
60

Rowe argues that the development of technology reciprocates with economic forces, invoking our contention that
many contemporary rituals, such as sports, have been overcoded by capitalist or State assemblages: “I have argued
here that the media are both the driving economic and cultural force in sport because they provide (or attract) most
of the capital that in turn creates and disseminates the images and information, which then generate more capital and
more sport, in an ascending spiral” (Rowe, 68).
61
“By the second decade of the twentieth century, ‘Spectator sport was [now] attracting massive crowds’ (Clarke
and Critcher 1985: 74), especially of working-class men. On this basis, a whole economy of sport developed as:
sporting clubs and associations were formed by subscribing members; competitions were established with attractive
prize money; imposing venues with large crowd capacities were built; state funds were donated to the development
of sport; sportswear and fan merchandise were manufactured and sold; and (of particular significance for this book)
newspapers, magazines, newsreels, films, radio (and, later, television) programmes became devoted to sport”
(Rowe, 21).
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increasingly valorized, a commodity that could be produced, sold, exchanged and
distributed” (Rowe, 69).
While capitalist and State assemblages have signified sports as sacred rituals and addictions as
profane rituals, as will become clear in the upcoming discourses from online sports forums, the
sports fanatic expresses a strong similarity to characteristics of addiction. Writing on modern
football, Bromberger muses that “we are told that we are dealing with the opium of the
people…” (Bromberger, 294). Based on the messages exchanged by sports fanatics, we can see
how addiction’s supposed distinction from sports becomes increasingly blurred.
Online Discourses of the Sports Fanatic
What is considered harmful and who defines it? As the contemporary conception of addiction
has a demarcated criteria62 with which the condition can be properly diagnosed and distinguished
from ‘normal’ behaviours, we can contrast these characteristics – tolerance; withdrawal; dosage;
craving; unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and recovering; usage
getting in the way of social or occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in
spite of knowledge of physical or psychological harms associated with use (DSM IV and V) –
with the promoted rituals of sports. As such, the sports assemblage has spawned passionate
online communities devoted to discussing, supporting and criticizing the state of ‘our team’ that
reflect a burgeoning dissolution of distinctions of harmfulness (in addiction). While members of
the online social groups write about their affections to the team, they also solidify these emerging
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Institutional discourses of addiction prescribe two fundamental locations of addiction, at times not mutually
exclusive: a physiological presence (in a drug user), associated with a pathological compulsive behaviour; and the
consistently negative consequences of a (drug) habit. Furthermore, the conventional conception of ‘addiction’, now
often described as ‘dependence’ or ‘substance abuse’, is defined by: tolerance; withdrawal; dosage; craving;
unsuccessful attempts at quitting; time spent obtaining, using, and recovering; usage getting in the way of social or
occupational activities and responsibilities; and recurrent use in spite of knowledge of physical or psychological
harms associated with use (DSM IV and V) We have also added another notion from Bruce Alexander, Stanton
Peele and Gabor Maté that addictions provide a sense of belonging, or community.
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discussion forums as a highly functional rhetorical component of the sports assemblage,
invoking the claim that addictions are highly ritualized behaviours (in the sense that a junkie may
be ‘addicted’ to the rituals of using, in addition to the affects of the drug – further blurring the
essentiality of the principles of addiction). Therefore, the sports fanatic embodies the exclusive
principles of addiction, in its physiological affects, its ritual functions, its sense of belonging to a
social group (or the sacred), and its relation to a harmful model of behaviour.
The following discourses come from the online forums of four sports teams covering two sports:
the Toronto Maple Leafs, of the National Hockey League, and the soccer clubs of Liverpool,
Manchester, and Tottenham. The structure of these forums are largely the same, despite some
variety in the interface: in the hockey forum, there is one main page of open discussion, whereas
the soccer forums have demarcated threads for specific topics – yet both have been conducive to
providing unparalleled discourses of the sports fanatic, wherein not only is there a re-creation of
the religious function through the ritualization of moral laws and an opposition to the profane,
but we may also observe essential elements of addiction, such as craving and tolerance:
“LN-093> Loric76: Today is like game 1 against Boston. I can't focus at all.
peterbleafs> LN-093: Ditto my mind is not on work. :)
DoiT4DougiE> LN-093: haha ya I agree, I couldnt sleep well at all last night. I had
to call in "sick" (excited) to work cuz i knew nothing produtive would get done.”
“burroz: I need another trade!!! Too long since the last one.
nrandreycharles: WHO IS NEXT I ALREADY WANT MORE :( trades is a hell
of a drug..
Reimocerous: Thank you for the trade Maple Leafs. I'll take another now please.”
“wiski: Be patient they said.....Fuck that I said. ;)
Loric76: Can't wait for tonight.”
In drug addiction, a body’s physiological response to an expected contact with a drug has been
observed clinically, and at times we see that the body releases dopamine (endorphins) in its
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excitation and expectation before actual contact with the drug (Watson, 1032-3)63. The pleasure
outside of ‘being-high’ or ‘being-addicted’ (noted as the process of ‘becoming-high’ or
‘becoming-addicted’) may also be illustrated in the spectacle of sports, which implicates our
conventional notions of drugs:
“LeafsFanSince93: OHHHH BABBYYYYY! Like a kid on Christmas. Except I'll
probably be too nervous to actually enjoy the game. I'll enjoy the build up more than
sweating the game.”
It is being suggested that the spectacle of sports functions in the same manner as what is
conventionally categorized as drugs. Thus, when we question ‘what is a drug?’ we find another
sacred space of moralistic ideals. This is because the dilemma of knowing what drugs and
addiction are is the false problem of their respective discourses of prescription, which Jacques
Derrida recognized in his brief essay The Rhetoric of Drugs:
“There is not in the case of drugs any objective, scientific, physical (physicalities), or
‘naturalistic’ definition… Already one must conclude that the concept of drugs is not
a scientific concept, but is rather instituted on the basis of moral or political
evaluations: it carries in itself both norm and prohibition, allowing no possibility of
description or certification - it is a decree, a buzzword (mot d'ordre)” (Derrida, 229).
For this reason, a discourse on drugs and addiction does not presuppose the pre-existing affects,
but rather it encompasses the traces of its functions: “As with addiction, the concept of drugs
supposes an instituted and an institutional definition: a history is required, and a culture,
conventions, evaluations, norms, an entire network of intertwined discourses, a rhetoric, whether
explicit or elliptical” (ibid). To speak only of the molecular structure of THC (the psychoactive
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“…there is evidence in primates that dopamine cell firing appears to be associated with the expectation, rather
than the receipt of reward. Consistent with this in humans, expectation of methylphenidate has been shown to result
in larger increases in brain metabolism in cocaine-dependent individuals, than when it is unexpected. Also dopamine
release in response to cocaine cues has been demonstrated in the dorsal striatum of individuals abusing cocaine.
Increased dopamine levels in the right putamen have also been reported to heroin-related cues in abstinent opioiddependent individuals” (Watson, 1032-3).
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compound in cannabis sativa) or the human dopamine system is to presuppose and reaffirm the
prominent discourses of drugs and addiction.
In sports as in drugs, as one eventually reaches ‘being-high’, it is never a feeling which lasts and
is always met with the experience of withdrawal, or the ‘post-high body’. Sports create a relief
for this by inherently having a next game and a next season:
“Xxxxxnew: I've been watching since '1961, and I remember my dad saying after the
leafs sucked in the 67-68 season after winning the cup the year before, ‘Don't worry,
they just had an off year.’”
“Burtonboy: nine "fuckin" years waiting for this one [game]. Been a long time
coming and many many times I wondered if it was worth it. YEEEEEEEE
HAWWWWWWW . Bring on the Bruins, it's worth every minute right now.”
While part of the institutional understanding of addiction is based on physiological symptoms as
those which have been described, addiction is also characterized based on a scale of harmfulness,
which at times includes the happiness of the addict: “Just as ‘junkies’ are not otherwise happy,
well-integrated people who happen to want some heroin every few hours, severe gambling, food,
sex, and work addicts3 are not otherwise happy, well-integrated people who happen to
overindulge regularly” (Alexander, 41). That addicts3 are not “well-integrated or happy”
represents a relation to an authoritative moral ideal which speaks on behalf of the addict. This
very same mechanism, which is an authoritatively prescribed ideal that subjectifies bodies, can
be seen in the body of the sports fanatic. The ideal body of the sports fanatic, in the private
languages of sports, is phrased as such: “are you a true fan or a fair-weather fan?” While the
conventional problem of addiction is that a particular behaviour either does or does not follow
the path of the ideal, the foray into the body of the sports fanatic reveals two things at the start:
an identification between ’your’ team and the enemy; and an identification between the “true”
fanatic and the “plastic” or “fake” fanatic:
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“20 Bobby Pulford: I have been a Leaf fan since 1959. I am also a native
Torontonian and this team is wrapped up in my identity. That was just the way it was
when I was a kid, so I was brought up on this stuff. I cannot even imagine supporting
another team, so I live and die with them every year. I do love this site though; I
really believe the true Leaf fans are here.”
When it comes to a prescribed ideal, which in modern society may be reduced to a subject that
produces, consumes, and follows the law, it is engendered by a model of duration and repetition
and functions based on the mechanism of group inclusion/exclusion (you’re born into a group –
wherein you have a choice of excluding yourself from the indoctrinated ideal, or maintaining the
path of the ideal). Like in many religions, the effectiveness of repetition from an early age
functions as a powerful mechanism for affects and rhetoric. For Deleuze, the first drink of the
alcoholic repeats the last one64. While a Christian baptismal is the symbolic subjection (of
identity) into the religion, the child being born into parents who already self-identify, along with
the repetition of rituals and spectacles, are the functioning machines of reproducing the
assemblage. For a sports fanatic, there is also a first introduction into the assemblage: from a
young age, identification can be produced from a parent’s identification with a team or through
the geographical territory that the fanatic occupies (is born into). This can be illustrated by what
it means to be the “best Red” (“true” fan):
“Being local. Buying the new shirt every season. Going to all the home games.
Going to lots of away games. Being the best moaner. Knowing the words to YNWA
[team song]. Understanding the history of the club. Backing the owners.”
The capture of attention and subsequent attachment of the body of the sports fanatic is affectual
(consuming the spectacle, a sense of belonging to a community), semiotic (creating a community
through languages, inclusivity/exclusivity in discourse and membership, the establishment of
hierarchies and norms), territorial (identity based on birthplace, a totalizing subjectivity) and
64

See (Boutang and Pamart, 1996).
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mechanistic (memorizing team songs and history). Furthermore, the production of affects and the
norms necessary to sustain these assemblages of identities is most successfully created
linguistically, typically through authoritative utterances. In these cases, the nomothetes, or the
creator of the ‘ideal’ carries the authority, and most importantly, distinguishes the failure to
fulfill the norms as meaning exclusion from the group. Here is an online thread created to
categorize and identify the “true” fan:
“Have you been to more than 50 matches? Does your father follow the same team as
you? Will your son be brainwashed into supporting the same side as you? Does a
shitty result ruin your weekend? Can you name the most recent starting XI? Do you
know who your game next week is against? Have you only ever supported one club
side? Have you ever stayed up until 3am to watch a crappy stream? Have you ever
changed/cancelled plans to watch a match? If you can answer yes to at least 5 of
these, you pass the test.”
The hierarchy between a “true” and “fake” fan or the “good” and “bad” team is analogous to the
transcendent hierarchization of religious subjects (as outlined by Bromberger65), namely between
sacred and profane subjects. Mimicking the religious function of creating a hierarchized world,
these norms lead sports fanatics to embody a similar sense of belonging, such as when 20 Bobby
Pulford proclaims that: “…I cannot even imagine supporting another team… this team is
wrapped up in my identity.” The illusion of a difference between sports teams, nations, or
religions and their accompanying identities is sustained by the difference between groups (“my
team” vs. “the other team”) and the ritualizations of the ideal. In sports, there is an ideal of
success which the subject can pursue:
65

“…the organization and the working principles of the world of football also share some common ground with the
world of religion. After the fashion of church bodies, the world of football has its own laws and strict
hierarchy…Secondly, the distribution of spectators within the precincts of the stadium recalls, in many respects, the
rigorous ordering of the different social groups attending important religious ceremonies. In both cases, three main
concurrent principles determine how the space will be occupied: the usual social hierarchy (with the V.I.P.’s who
flaunt themselves in the best seats and boxes); the hierarchy of the football world itself (directors, representatives of
the leagues and federations, etc., are accommodated in reserved seats), then a hierarchy based on the fervour and the
strength of support” (Bromberger, 307).
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“Insidious: Have you no sense whatsoever of what Liverpool Football Club is
about??? We are about winning football matches and winning trophies. That's it.”
“palmers_green_yid: I think a majority of modern football fans are prepared to
sacrifice identity if they think that it may give them a chance of success. Success is
their equivalent of the money the businessmen are after; it makes them do desperate
things.”
As ‘success’ or the ‘ideal’ (in sports or heroin) is evidently short and temporary, an addiction
becomes located in the relations external to the object. Bodies of addiction that are formed by
ideals of success necessarily experience the reciprocating struggle of dealing with withdrawal
from success, which seems to be a natural element of sacred ritualizations of alcohol, tobacco,
and sports:
“alex callis: Blah, I'm so sick of this team.
Radar O'Rielly: So quit being a fan.
JR from Halifax: Why should he quit?
Radar O'Rielly: Why shouldn't he?
JR from Halifax: Because he is a fan.......frustrated like many of us”
In an online discussion thread named “how do you get over a bad result?” sports fanatics evoke
their personal struggles with withdrawal symptoms:
“Irrational: Obviously bad results affect some people more than others. Like
yesterday, when a result completely ruins your weekend - what do you do to get over
it or make you feel better? Any rituals in particular that you partake in? I usually
replay the game on FIFA [video game] and beat the team heavily, that eases the pain
somewhat. Then go out with friends and pretend the result never happened, and think
about the FIFA result. For me ignoring it is the only way I can get it out of my head
and ruining my day further.
2 Man Midfield: Just ignore football/sport media for a day or two. After a while the
withdrawal symptoms are enough to get me excited about the next fixture.
unitedbhoy: Talk it out with my dad. I always need to have a reason for a defeat what went wrong, who to blame, what can be improved and how. Also like to point
out some positives from the game, if there are any. Then watch more football, or
watch the NFL if the games on Sunday, accompanied by alcohol.
JohnnyLaw: I can't, the only way I'll get over it is if we win the next game. Needless
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to say, my spirits kind of crushed at the moment.
Roopea: For me, it just completely ruins my day. Nothing has improved my mood
after we have had a bad result, even during the successful Fergie years when I knew
everything would be alright come the end of the season.
izec: Nothing helps, it ruins the day for me if we lose like yesterday.
The-Natural: The defeat to Real in 2013 was the hardest result I've ever had to get
over. I was off work all week and drank every night and got in to so many heated
arguments with strangers in pubs. The anger just wouldn't subside for a good
fortnight.”
These overwhelming attachments even lead to participants considering quitting their addiction.
Whether it’s for a team whose recent history sports enviable success (such as the above
discussion between fans of Manchester United, who have won 9 championships in recent
memory) or a team whose most recent success (in winning a championship) was over 40 years
ago, as we have already seen with examples of withdrawal, the body of the sports fanatic will
encounter these conventional characteristics of addiction, and others, such as failed attempts to
quit:
“Burtonboy: Fuck it . I'm tired of all this negativity surrounding the Leafs . After 50
+ yrs following the buds it looks like its time to get a new team.
Yaknowwhat: If only it was that easy BB...we're all hopelessly addicted to this
team...”
“Yaknowwhat: sometimes I truly believed we are cursed....we seem to be the
loveable laughable losers...year in....year out....trying times to be fan of this
team....that's for sure...
phaneufoundlander If I could change colours I'd be gone long ago....the team is a
disgrace
Yaknowwhat: Yep....for whatever reason I can't leave....I was born in Toronto...the
Leafs were always a part of me...like it or not I will have a Leaf logo on my casket...”
“Xxxxxnew: I've been a fan since 1961. Year after year is Groundhog Day.
20 Bobby Pulford Since 1959 or so myself. I stopped drinking the cool aid a while
ago, because it has been feeling like April Fool's Day.”
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Such behaviour results in the forum performing the functions of a therapy group, supporting
members who want to quit, successfully or not:
“TuckerForCompassion: So there you all have it. I'm addicted to this place like
many but don't like the taste anymore. And am quitting. Thank you for the years of
great fun MLHS. But nothing lasts forever.
Responses: “see you in a couple hours,” “I understand the sentiment,” “Take care,
enjoy your vacation and hopefully see you back soon.”
Another response: Knights2Leafs: Take some time away. I did for 4 months and I
don't let it bleed into my everyday life any more.”
“TuckerForCompassion: How many in their processing of grief have taken any
blame? I at least have in admitting I got carried away these past few seasons
focusing on the negative constantly.
MaxwellHowe: You must learn to laugh at the Leafs. The Leafs are a carnival..it'll
be great when they win again....but at least, when they lose, they do so hilariously.
The key is laughter my friend.
colino17: I am a die hard Leafs fan and always will be no matter how the team is
doing, but @MaxwellHowe is right, the key to maintaining sanity through the tough
times is a combination of hope and humor. Lose either and all you have left is
misery.”
Affects of addiction can be illustrated to the extent and intensity in non-conventional sources to
the point where the “broad continuum” of ‘addiction’ becomes a stratum66 or apparatus of
capture which reinforces the arbitrary differentiation between ‘problematic’ and ‘nonproblematic’ uttered by authoritative sources, and in the case of the state or capitalist machine, is
why the sports fanatic is not and will not be considered an addict, despite the prevalence of
affects of addiction. The crux of the issue is how and who determines what is ‘problematic’,
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“Strata are Layers, Belts. They consist of giving form to matters, of imprisoning intensities or locking singularities
into systems of resonance and redundancy, of producing upon the body of the earth molecules large and small and
organizing them into molar aggregates. Strata are acts of capture, they are like “black holes” or occlusions striving
to seize whatever comes within their reach. They operate by coding and territorialisation upon the earth; they
proceed simultaneously by code and by territoriality. The strata are judgments of God; stratification in general is the
entire system of the judgment of God…” (A Thousand Plateaus, 40)
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especially given the limitless presence of ‘problematic’ affects that conventionally characterizes
addiction.
While winning games and championships appears to be the raison d’être of being a sportsfanatic, other ideals can be transmuted onto the sports fanatic, meaning that not only is there a
sense of belonging to a team, but a collective sense of belonging with family too:
“Niagara_Leafs: Here's a thing for you folks........Im almost 46,,,,,my son is
18.......TONIGHT, we shared every Leafs shot.....GOAL, and finally the WIN. I'm a
divorced Dad...always did my best.....But tonight was special.....
MSM>Niagara_Leafs: I watched four cup wins with my dad. I remember it fondly.”
As ‘being-high’ is short and temporary, the pleasure of the high needs to become associated with
external relations. For the heroin addicts that Gabor Maté encounters on the Downtown Eastside
of Vancouver, their addiction represents “the only home they’ve ever had” (Maté, 18). It is
becoming evident that the sports fanatic is attracted to much more than the enjoyment/immersion
into the actual game, which Guy Debord would consider as the commodity as spectacle. Yet,
what appears to make sports so popular is the reconciliation of Debord’s proclamation that “the
spectacle’s function in society is the concrete manufacture of alienation” (Debord, 10). In effect,
the spectacle of (professional) sports encompasses much more than the game itself, but is all of
the things which are attached or engendered by the game, such as the sense of belonging to a
team, the feeling of community and friendship on online forums, or, illustrated by the fevered
dialogue above, the pleasures taken from the management of the team, such as in ‘trades’
(exchanges of players by one team with another).
In the sports assemblage, this totalization is evidenced by the prominence and popularity of
sports media (radio, television, newspaper, blogs and discussion forums) and in our case, we see
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how important the engagement with an online forum is to the connection of being a sports
fanatic:
“CanuckUKinToronto: One thing about MLHS, we are all Leaf fans.. many die
hard.. We dedicate a lot of free time on this site.. so it also becomes a hangout in
some way... Many of us are quite diverse but have great conversations/debates on the
Leafs.. and sometimes in the Mashup on other points.. learning, or debating.. The
site has great articles with authors who are very informative and the extra value is
just how contributory many posters are on there- for their insight, comments,
retweets etc... sharing info on the Leafs and hockey.. but also not just a good hockey
social network but also brings together some comradory with diverse people who end
up sharing some other interests and commentary some times.. like tunes/ other
worldly discussions too... "Virtual Friends"..”
“Burtonboy: Thanks to you most of all for giving us this site to vent out frustrations
and cheer for the Leafs. Friendships that will last a lifetime”
“Bon Scott was a Leaf fan: Nice way to cap off the workweek, coming home to
another MLHS interview with Leaf brass. Great work guys!! Keep it up!!”
“OTL: Alec: Just wanted to say that your site has been a GREAT MEMOIRE of
what the Leafs have gone through to get to this point.”
“Murph2417: I've been off of MLHS [the forum] for about a week and I didn't
realize how much I missed it. So glad I stumbled upon this site AND signed up to
have some conversation. This site is my most visited by far.”
What this is attempting to show is that the duration and location of the ‘being-addict’ is much
wider than initially categorized. Moreover, the take-over of the body and soul of the addict by
the totalizing addiction, a form that even Bruce Alexander relies on67 as he alludes to a loss of
soul in the addict3, as his life becomes almost totally related to his fix (getting it, using it,
recovering from it, etc.), can be expressed by a continuum to be present in many pursuits, in this
67

Alexander uses the modern transformation of the location of addiction as a presupposition to its existence,
illustrated by his proclamation that “the material and social harm of addiction1 can be horrendous, yet the spiritually
minded temperance activists perceived – correctly I believe – an even more nightmarish feature: addicted1 people
seemed to have lost their souls to alcohol. In nonreligious terms, those who became addicted1 were so
overwhelmingly involved with drinking that they became different people, alien to their own society and to their
own previous identities…Why, apart from a kind of possession by ‘demon rum’, would anyone give themselves
over to the horrors of life as an alcoholic?” (Alexander, 31).
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case sports fanaticism. As the time outside of the spectacle is accounted for in sources of
consumption (and their accompanying affects, such as friendship), such as online forums or
sports radio, it becomes clear that the spectacle itself is structured by norms and rituals.
Richard Doyle makes this claim for psychedelic drugs, wherein he argues that rhetorical
discourses surrounding psychedelic drugs structure our experience with them. He points to
online trip-reports, which describe in detail a user’s firsthand experience, acting as maps or
frames for an experience68. This notion may be analogously observed in sports, as we have seen,
by the prominence of an online discussion forum in the enjoyment of being a sports fan. But it is
also observable in the ‘direction’ of the discourse – in psychedelic trip reports69, it would be the
difference between positive or negative experiences to report. A reader of the report may desire
or expect to find positive or negative reports, or they may search and read neutrally. So too in
sports discourse do we see that fans search for a directional discourse which suits their
engagement, either positively or negatively:
“MaxwellHowe: Thanks Aaron, and MLHS, for continuing to permit readers to see
the many rays of sunshine beaming on our team. So much doom and gloom with the
MSM [mainstream media] and other lesser Leaf websites.”
“Grant: The most amazing thing for me in this playoff run has been the number of
regular posters on this site who have totally disappeared. It's as though they weren't
really Leaf fans at all but posters who get the most enjoyment out of nitpicking every
shift the team plays.”
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In Darwin’s Pharmacy, Richard Doyle pursues the notion that “rhetorical technologies structure and enable
fundamentally different kinds of ecodelic experiences” (Doyle, 21). Moreover, Doyle writes “language becomes the
occasion for a feedback loop, where utterances and writings that seem to enable the endurance and enjoyment of
psychedelic experience are replicated, programming further ecodelic investigations, and so on” (Doyle, 115).
69
The function of psychedelic trip-reports according to Richard Doyle is being ascribed to online forums of
discussion for sports fanatics: For Doyle, “trip reports are first and foremost protocols, scripts for the better or worse
ingestion of psychedelic plants and compounds” (Doyle, 47). They are rhetorical software: “linguistic, visual,
musical, and narrative sequences whose function resides less in their ‘meaning’ than in their capacity to be repeated
and help generate patterns of response. They are part of the psychonaut apparatus, not a supplement to it” (Doyle,
50).
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A furthermore example is in the fact that sports games are characteristically accompanied by
play-by-play analysts or color commentators. This rhetorization of the game can be illustrated to
structure the experience, most evidently within the language of the dualism of “my team” and
“the other team.” Here are some dialogues of commentaries about particular announcers:
“Wook: Cole is such a Leafs fan, which is great for us but not surprising that other
fans do not like him. It was pretty humorous listening to him during the turds
[opposition team] game, repeating things like "Ottawa regains the zone but there is
nothing to it once again as the Leafs handily clear the puck". I love his use of proLeafs adjectives.”
“hockeyfanfirst: Can't stand CBC. All of them are critical of the leafs.”
“daniel marois: Guys, I have always been a huge Chris Cuthbert fan and a shame
CBC let him get away to TSN many years ago. His Crosby gold medal winning call
still gives me chills… I cannot STAND Hughson/Simpson. His play call "Great
save!" makes me throw something at the TV every time. Simpson is so wooden and
provides nothing to the telecast.”
The point here is not only that the similarity between what are the medically (and
conventionally) accepted notions of addiction do not distinguish themselves from non-addictive
behaviors, but also that even within the space of behaviors which may resemble addictive
behavior but are not so considered, there is an illusory experience between ‘harmful’ and ‘notharmful.’ That is, the fans of those teams who have an ‘acceptable tolerance level’ of success and
moreover those that have had some or more success, do not consider their indulgences as
harmful or questionable; meanwhile, sports franchises who have had little to no success in an
unacceptable time-frame exhibit a much more pronounced ‘harmful’ discourse which questions
their own ‘addiction’, devotion, or loyalty to the team in spite of all the misery. It is here, in the
difference between the ‘harmful’ devotion or loyalty to a sports team and a not-harmful one
where we can see the fallacy in conceiving of ‘addiction’ based on a ‘harm’ model.
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Who defines what is harmful, abusive, overwhelming, or addictive? Who differentiates between
the affect of a ‘drug’ (artificial) and the affect of a ‘normal’ (natural) substance? When the
gambler becomes ‘problematic’, he becomes an object in need of further study and proper
classification, but only under the category of ‘addiction’. Is the gambler ‘addicted’ only because
the consequences of his use are defined as problematic? There continues to be an absence of
certainty within the conventional discourse of addiction on whether the fundamental components
of addiction are physiological or social, yet this failure has not restricted the creation and
reproduction of the conventional affects and assemblage of addiction. In addictions discourse,
the presupposed affect of addiction can be carried as far as it is desired – the boundaries continue
to widen: Avram Goldstein goes as far as to say that “there is no basis whatsoever in medical
science for setting aside the legal addictive drugs as different from the illicit ones,” which for
him means to include “heavy nicotine smokers,” “heavy alcohol drinkers,” and “heavy coffee
drinkers” as addicts (Goldstein, 4). His book argues that “drug addiction…is primarily a publichealth problem,” because it is understood that “the misery suffered by addicts and their families
is enormous. The costs to society—to all of us—are measured as loss of productivity, additional
needs for medical care, dangers of drug-induced behaviors, destruction of family life, corruption
of children, and burden on the criminal justice system” (Goldstein, 13). The criteria for
categorizing the affects of addiction are created not as a component part of a body (human or
drug), but only in relation to a discursive ideal that defines ‘problematic’ from ‘nonproblematic’. If this is the case, why is ‘addiction’ related to affects such as tolerance or
withdrawal and not to criteria such as “the costs to society” outlined by Goldstein? If they were
related according to the latter, the continuum of addiction would quickly be diluted by its
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inability to be differentiated or captured and therefore, conventionally, the experience of any
substance or pursuit would be subject to ‘addiction’.
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Chapter 3
Distinguishing Between Discourses Of and On Addiction
As Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari write that “an assemblage, in its multiplicity, necessarily
acts on semiotic flows, material flows, and social flows simultaneously” (A Thousand Plateaus,
22), we may remark that in addiction we also encounter its discourses, its material
manifestations, and its relation to authority. That is, after the first two chapters, we may say that
the concept of addiction is much more complex than a simple scientific classification: the
concept is traced to a notion of conquest, characterized by the colonization of rituals by sacred
authorities who have rationalized a distinction between the good and bad (truth and lie, healthy
and harmful). The territorialization of the addiction assemblage reflects the colonization of truth,
rituals, people and drugs.
The power which emanates from conquest can be effectively reflected in Eliade’s terms of
religion: the ordering of chaos (which creates life) engenders the distinction between the sacred
and profane (the real, objective world where truth can be found). Such a relation to power is
what Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari so vociferously attempt to resist – the false sense of a
universal truth. Moreover, Foucault traces the production of truth as a rationalization for
subjugating the body (which develops into the concept of biopower70). As these models of
knowledge are remnants of the conquest of modern rationalism, the second section of this
chapter will encounter the industrial colonization of rituals in the films Jalsaghar, Shatrank-ke70

According to Nadesan, “Foucault developed the idea of biopower to capture technologies of power that address the
management of, and control over, the life of the population…For example, efforts to manage the health of
populations through pharmaceutical interventions serve market interests by relying on commodity solutions (e.g.,
drugs) and by purportedly delivering a healthier workforce without changing the conditions under which workers
labor, without changing market commodities consumed by labor (e.g., soda), and without changing industrial
pollutants that affect workers’ health. In 2005, Americans spent more than $200 billion on prescription drugs (Tone
& Watkins, 2007)” (Nadesan, 3).
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Khilatri, and Charulata, directed by Satyajit Ray, wherein the films facilitate an effective
discourse on addiction.
Meanwhile, the first part of this chapter will engage the chaos of drugs and how in a sacred
world, such as one based on the presupposition of objective truth, a discourse of drugs (and
addiction) has materialized. The text Love and Addiction by Stanton Peele will be complimented
by discourses from Richard Degrandpre in order to engage semiotic, material and social flows,
wherein the presupposition of a universal object of addiction rationalizes resistant attitudes
towards safe injection sites, paramilitary wars on drugs, mass incarceration of society, the
infiltration of law and profit into the medical body, and the prohibition of some substances and
the promotion of other substances and rituals.
I. The Nature of Addiction
What is the nature of addiction? The primary continuity present within our experiences with
drugs is their prescribed legitimacy – a material and discursive manifestation of power. In fact, a
characteristic of drugs may be that they actually lack continuity. In other words, not only do
physiological effects or a drug’s molecules not encompass a nature of drugs, but moreover,
factors external to drugs and the body fundamentally affect and shape our relation with drugs. In
some discourses on drugs, this is referred to as setting71. The notion of setting delineates both the
notion that drugs have an essential manner in which they affect the body, and the notion that all
bodies have an essential reaction to a drug: “Animal research uniformly demonstrates that
71

The usages of drugs reveal experiences that are amenable to factors such as set and setting. Betty Eisner denotes
set as the subject and setting as the environment of the experience. Studies on both humans and animals have
exposed that critical factors in a drug experience are affected by mentality and surroundings. “In a classic study of
the placebo effect, Louis Lasagna and his co-workers found that 30 to 40 percent of a group of postoperative
patients couldn’t tell the difference between morphine and a placebo that they were told was morphine…Lasagna’s
placebo experiment demonstrated that people’s reactions to a drug are determined by what they think the drug is as
by what it actually is” (Peele, 28).
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nondrug factors figure prominently in the development of drug desires and drug experiences”
(Degrandpre, 80).
The malleability of the drug experience and its relation to authoritative sources of truth was
evoked by Degrandpre: “Early studies provided animals unlimited access to intravenous cocaine
or morphine in highly isolated and impoverished environments. The result was that monkeys and
rats sometimes self-administered drugs until death…These findings…reinforced the prevailing
ideology of angels and demons.” (Degrandpre, 78). However, what becomes ignored are results
which do not fit the narrative or the original moralistic propulsions:
“there is a vast array of animal studies, not seen in the media, showing that these
toxic patterns of drug use are not sustained except under the most sterile conditions.
When drug-taking environments are filled with alternative activities and the
opportunity for social interaction, drug use fades…The notion that one can
generalize from a barren laboratory model to human drug use conforms to the
prevailing pharmacologicalism, where drug effects have nothing to do with context
and culture, and everything to do with assumptions about fixed pharmacological
actions of drug molecules” (Ibid).
Despite writing a discourse of addiction based on the ‘fixed actions’ of humans, Stanton Peele
also recognized the notion that drugs may escape classification: “The response people have to a
given drug is determined by their personalities, their cultural backgrounds, and their expectations
and feelings about the drug” (Peele, 20). Moreover, “since people who take narcotics often do
not get addicted, scientists are beginning to think that addiction does not exist” (Peele, 3). Peele
does not affirm the notion that ‘addiction does not exist’. Instead, his conclusion to the clinical
observation that drug experiences are highly variable, is not that a condition such as drug
addiction cannot contain the empirical continuity of a pathological concept, but rather that the
natural condition of addiction usurps its drug-based origins: “If addiction is now known not to be
primarily a matter of drug chemistry or body chemistry, and if we therefore have to broaden our
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conception of dependency-creating objects to include a wider range of drugs, then why stop at
drugs?” (ibid). While Peele rejects a body- or drug-based essence to addiction, he locates his
object in a social psychology. Indeed, in order to legitimize his idea of the pathology of love, he
presupposes the thing of addiction, wherein some love relationships are “just about the most
common, yet least recognized, form of addiction” (Peele, 5).
Herein we may see the modern relation of the sacred (which believes in a ‘true reality’) to the
profane: in the science of addiction, we have presupposed the existence of an ‘objective reality’
which engenders a theory of addiction; however, since an ‘objective reality’ is nothing more than
an anthropomorphic creation, akin to religious creation, it is unable to provide a rational certainty
(or a complete understanding) of objects, thereby sustaining the moralistic underpinnings to
scientific theories of addiction. In Peele (as in most discourses of addiction), the essence of
addiction lies in the moral valuation of a behaviour (in the first chapter, this was described as the
‘harmfulness’ model, wherein a scientific truth has been created by classifying deviant
behaviours):
“If what a person is engaged in enhances his ability to live – if it enables him to work
more effectively, to love more beautifully, to appreciate the things around him more,
and finally, if it allows him to grow, to change, and expand – then it is not addictive.
If, on the other hand, it diminishes him – if it makes him less attractive, less capable,
less sensitive, and if it limits him, stifles him, harms him – then it is addictive”
(Peele, 60).
In discourses of addiction, the addict and the drug appear as the problem of addiction – “the
problem drinker.” This moralizing evaluation which engenders a scientific concept of addiction
is also evident in the rationalizations of colonization, whether they are territorial, discursive,
social, individual or ritualistic. The scientific theorization of addiction is the sacred prescription
of profanity onto an object, thereby colonizing the signifier of the object (it now represents evil)
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and its material manifestations (it becomes prohibited or transformed). Whether it is a religious,
discursive or social mechanism, engendering an objective law (such as the natural laws of
scientific concepts) through moralization is essential to discourses of addiction, such as when
Neil Levy, the editor of Addiction and Self-Control, decries the “problem” of addiction:
“Addiction, especially addiction to nicotine and alcohol, is a serious public health
problem…Process addictions like pathological gambling also produce great harms” (Levy, 1).
In effect, when the traditional word addiction was transformed from an ambiguous capacity for
devotion into a natural condition by sources of authority, the concept of addiction became a
discursive and material apparatus that would always “find a desire to reconstitute the ‘ideal
body’ or the ‘perfect body’” (Derrida, 244). In other words, the transformation of the word
addiction enabled authorities to not only legitimize a conception of what they determine to be
‘harmful’ behaviour (as has been discussed, according to Eliade, that which threatens the sacred
world, is deemed the profane), but to facilitate the manifestation of sacred rituals. In regards to
modern drug laws, Richard Degrandpre describes the religious language of pharmacologicalism
as reinforcing an “essentialism of drugs, of angels and demons,” wherein the drug cocaine
represents the profane and the drug Ritalin72 represents the sacred, meanwhile both drugs share
essential similarities: “methylphenidate [Ritalin], like cocaine, increases synaptic dopamine by
inhibiting dopamine reuptake, it has equivalent reinforcing effects to those of cocaine, and its
intravenous administration induces a ‘high’ similar to that of cocaine” (Degrandpre, 77).
In this respect, we can see how the concept of addiction functions as an apparatus of the State of
capitalism: despite the fact that Ritalin and cocaine share essential similarities, the former has
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Ritalin is “the most commonly prescribed psychotropic medication for children in the United States” (Degrandpre,
77).
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become a multi-million dollar social drug, while the latter was used as a mechanism to control
the black population in the United States of America (as noted in the first chapter, in reference to
Jonathan Ott’s text Pharmacotheon – p. 52). There is thus a dynamic relation between discourses
of drugs and addiction, power over our bodies, and sources of authority, wherein the knowledge
and power within the concepts territorialize individual and social bodies. Saran Ghatak has thus
articulated a Foucauldian approach to the concept of drugs and addiction as a form of biopower
which we continue to endure: “As the drug problem was constructed as a deadly threat to the
health, wealth and morals of the nation, it legitimized surveillance and intervention at an
unprecedented level within a democratic system of governance” (Ghatak, 52). Furthermore,
beyond only the violent apparatuses of the State, the ‘drug problem’ also emerged alongside the
discursive and material formation of medicine (the ‘good’ drugs) or rituals such as sports or
drinking
In discourses of addiction there is no space for the chaotic (drug) experience beyond the
prescribed conceptual limits, therefore the object of a discourse on addiction is not the
classification of a natural law, but the authoritative function of concept formation. As was noted
at the beginning of the second chapter, a discourse of addiction functions as a ‘majority
language’, while a discourse on addiction as a ‘minority language’: “Majority assumes a state of
power and domination…A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be
considered minoritarian” (A Thousand Plateaus, 105).
Discourses Of Addiction Territorialize the Story of the Addict
Nick’s father drilled into his twin sons the notion that they were nothing but ‘pieces of shit’…
Another man described the way his mother used a mechanical babysitter when he was three
years old. ‘She went to the bar to drink and pick up men. Her idea of keeping me safe and from
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getting into trouble was to stick me in the dryer. She put a heavy box on top so I couldn’t get
out.’73
While Gabor Maté tells the stories of the addicts he encounters to better understand the scientific
nature of addiction (meaning, his text remains a discourse of addiction), he nonetheless uses
genealogical methods by historicizing the concept which delimits the location (of the presence)
of addiction. In other words, while the concept of addiction is sustained by power and
rationalized through a discourse which locates the presence of addiction in physiological
symptoms characteristic of a disease and/or the relation of a habit to its negative consequences, a
historical discourse deterritorializes the prescribed characteristics of addiction (though Maté
reterritorializes addiction based on prescribed discourses). For Maté, this is related to the purpose
of his work at The Portland Hotel in Vancouver: “We do not expect to cure anyone, only to
ameliorate the effects of drug addiction and its attendant ailments and to soften the impact of the
legal and social torments our culture uses to punish the drug addict” (Maté, 21). As Maté’s
material encounters with addicts resist the sacred discourses of addiction (which clearly reject the
addict), his historical discourses are also reticent of a resisting discourse on addiction.
While discourses of addiction presuppose the profanity of addiction in relation to a sacred body
or world, which engenders the subjection of the drug, drug abuser, and drug dealer, Maté’s resituation of addicts, while categorical, does not invoke but rather implicates the imposition of
medical, capital, or state assemblages, such as in the currently occurring battle to create safe
injection sites in Canada:
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“The research literature is unequivocal: most hard-core substance abusers come from abusive homes. The majority
of my Skid Row patients suffered severe neglect and maltreatment early in life. Almost all the addicted women
inhabiting the Downtown Eastside were sexually assaulted in childhood, as were many of the men. The
autobiographical accounts and case files of Portland residents tell stories of pain upon pain: rape, beatings,
humiliation, rejection, abandonment, relentless character assassination. As children they were obliged to witness the
violent relationships, self-harming life patterns or suicidal addictions of their parents—and often had to take care of
them” (Maté, 32-3).

74
“One afternoon in August 2006 I called a CBC radio program to discuss Insite,
Vancouver’s controversial supervised injection facility for drug users. Just before the
moderator turned to me, he interviewed an RCMP officer. Dozens of addicts who
have overdosed at Insite have been successfully resuscitated, the host pointed out.
Lives have been saved that might otherwise have been lost. That’s not necessarily a
good thing, the Mountie spokesman explained. ‘It’s well known that negative
consequences are the only major deterrent to drug use. If you are saving people’s
lives, you are sending the message that it’s safe to use drugs’” (Maté, 210).
While the social contextualization of addiction still reterritorializes a concept of addiction, it also
features a problematizing technique that, without a categorical interpretation, would discursively
implicate the creators of sacred ideals, just as Gabor Maté writes about his encounters with
addicts: “How to offer them comfort when their sufferings are made worse every day by social
ostracism—by what the scholar and writer Elliot Leyton has described as the bland, racist, sexist
and classist prejudices buried in Canadian society: an institutionalized contempt for the poor, for
sex trade workers, for drug addicts and alcoholics, for aboriginal people” (Maté, 21).
Analogously, Bruce Alexander implicates the State and capital in his discourse of addiction:
“Dislocation and addiction are mass-produced by free-market society, which is a form of
hypercapitalism that any regime can impose, whether it labels itself as capitalist, neoconservative, neo-liberal, market socialist, socialist, labour, or anything else” (Alexander, 4).
While these authors reaffirm and sustain the concept of addiction, they do so by taking recourse
to resisting the sacred authorities which facilitate addiction’s material and semiotic subjugation.
In other words, while they discursively reaffirm discourses of addiction, the relations of their
material encounters with places such as safe injection sites resist the materiality of discourses of
addiction.
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II. Discourses On Addiction from the Films of Satyajit Ray
According to discourses of addiction, one is either addicted or one is not. This is typically
distinguished by the presence of symptoms or a pathology which compels addicts to keep doing
something (such as using drugs, or gambling), even in spite of its harmful consequences. Yet,
how can a diagnosis of addiction be subject to a moral interpretation? For this is precisely how
addiction is determined, as it has been based on the relation of a ritualized behaviour to its
perceived harmful consequences. In a discourse on addiction, however, there is no presumption
that there is a nature to addiction, and the focus is on sources of authority that prescribe morals
which have excluded rituals of addiction from the sacred.
The films Jalsaghar (The Music Room – 1958), Shatrank-ke-Khilatri (The Chess Players –
1977), and Charulata (1964), directed by Satyajit Ray, facilitate a discourse on addiction which
does not morally interpret or categorically determine addiction, but rather, offers a depiction of
the transformative qualities of individuals and society, notably from the pre-industrial society
through to the modern world. Ray’s upbringing was situated in a post-colonial time-period where
India had been colonized by the British, a reality which fostered an intimate subject matter for
Ray’s films, wherein the emancipatory struggles of the Indian woman emerged alongside the
social colonization of rituals. Therefore, according to Ben Nyce and Keya Ganguly, Ray’s
depictions of colonization was groundbreaking in Indian film, wherein “Ray is probably the
Indian film director most responsible for establishing a serious cinema in India which looks at
life as it is” (Nyce, 95)74.
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Ganguly writes that “[Ray’s] work becomes paradigmatic when he is placed within a wider artistic and political
conversation that attempted to rethink the conditions of possibility of art under capitalism” (K Ganguly, 25).
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Furthermore, Ray’s depiction of social rituals facilitates a discourse on addiction by portraying
the conventional characteristics of addiction within a contextualized space, opposing a
naturalized condition. For instance, in Jalsaghar, we encounter a zemindar who has a reckless
obsession to music, or jalsas (a classical Indian music recital), so much so, that not only does he
sell the remainder of his wife’s jewels in order to fund another jalsa, but he also orders his wife
and son back from a journey in order to attend the jalsa – a demand which results in both of their
drowning. A discourse of addiction would identify the reckless behaviour, the cravings, and the
attachment. And yet, as was mentioned in the first chapter, Georges Bataille describes premodern ritualizations of the surplus as necessitating their consumption, as opposed to their
modern transformation into rituals of accumulation. The zemindar’s belonging to the sacred
social caste meant participating in sacred rituals, such as the consumption of excess. The film’s
depiction of the zemindar’s ‘reckless obsession’ with music was thus driven by a belonging to a
social (sacred) group and participation in their prescribed rituals, and not as an underlying
condition of addiction. As Reena Dube notes in her text Satyajit Ray’s The Chess Players and
Postcolonial Theory, “It is only in and through this struggle that Ray allows the viewer to
question the value and function of music” (Dube, 23).
A common theme for Satyajit Ray is the conquest of the traditional aspects of life by modern
forces, including rituals. Thus, in his film Jalsaghar, as Ray opposes the disintegration of the
horse-riding zemindar to the modern automobile-driving character Ganguly, Darius Cooper
refers to the function of music in his text The Cinema of Satyajit Ray as not simply a ritual of the
traditional culture: “India’s classical musicians, we are made to realize, owe a great deal to these
aristocrats who had an authentic passion and deep understanding of their art” (Cooper, 68). But
moreover, the totalizing colonization of spaces such as India meant that traditional rituals were
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also being colonized, so that “the nouveau-riche like Mahim Ganguly, who succeeded the old
zamindars, only pretended to take over this patronage. They had neither the temperament nor the
ancestry to appreciate classical music…” (ibid). Ray succeeds in not only drawing attention to
the functional (and aesthetic) role of rituals in the time of pre-colonization, but also to the notion
that the rituals were being taken over, allowing the viewers to consider the function of
contemporary rituals. Thus, beyond the film, we may observe that over time the ritualization of
music has transformed into a global industry which contributes to sustaining the sacred worlds of
capitalism and the State.
The colonizing transformation of traditional rituals is also reflected in the subjects of addiction in
Ray’s films, as they all engage in ‘addictions’ which invoke the work/play binary of
colonization. As Dube elaborates,
“Enterprise depends on the following binary oppositions: colonial enterprise names
the industriousness and productive labour of empire building; it is a discourse that
represents itself as primarily oriented towards work, even play within enterprise is
oriented towards work and is a means of learning the rules of work; the binary half of
the discourse is indigenous work and play, described as wasteful and unproductive
exercises in valueless activity” (Dube, 1).
Furthermore, the depiction of rituals in Ray’s films evoke a playfulness which is so completely
opposed to the rationalized colonists, that this playfulness was itself the rationalization for
conquest. Thus, the ‘addictions’ become reckless only through their opposition to a more
powerful model, in this case that of the colonizers (otherwise, the ‘addictions’ would simply be
playful devotions to music, poetry or chess).
While, given the period and the place, Ray was not in a position to depict the post-modern
transformation of rituals, his films do lead us to an inquiry of the continued colonization of postmodern rituals, and moreover, his films contribute to a discourse on addiction because he
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provides an alternative to the dominant discourse (of colonization): “Colonialist discourses
foreclose and disallow the possibility of alternate understandings of the work/play binary, other
than the binary of enterprise as work and native culture as unproductive play” (Dube, 29).
Moreover, his depictions of addiction follow a historical-functional model of ritualized
behaviours that opposes the naturalization of a behaviour: In Shatrank-ke-Khilatri, his depiction
of the two Lucknowi chess players was unsympathetic because their obsession with the game
prevented them from confronting or resisting their colonization, and yet in the same film, his
depiction of King Wajid, despite his obsession with poetry, music and dance, which became the
rationalization for his colonization (and therefore the demise of Indian autonomy and traditional
culture), was very sympathetic. While, as Dube notes, Ray’s “discourse of the indolent and
debauched feudal landlord is resituated both in relation to questions concerning culture and
cultural authority,” it is our contention that Ray facilitates a discourse on addiction by resituating all his subjects of addiction to “questions concerning culture and cultural authority”
(Dube, 28).
Jalsaghar (The Music Room, 1958)
Jalsaghar is more than simply about documenting “the fading away of the feudal era (and its
replacement by the merchant middle class),” as scholarly critics Darius Cooper and Ben Nyce
proclaim75. Instead, Ray uses film to depict a transformative historical time with images of
colonization, specifically by following the story of Biswambhar Roy, a zamindar (feudal
landlord), who as Nyce says, is “the last of his line of landed aristocrats in British India” (Nyce,
44).
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(Cooper, 2) and (Nyce, 44).
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While Nyce and Cooper reduce the story of the zamindar, who is the subject of addiction in the
film, into a reckless addict who has “inherited a fatal love for music” (Cooper, 66)76 and
squandered “the meager remains of his wealth on musical evenings (jalsa) in the name of family
pride, as well as for the music itself” (Nyce, 44), Reena Dube asserts in contrast that
“critics like Seton and Nyce have tended to interpret Bishwambhar in an
individualistic manner, as a feudal landlord obsessed with music. To take this view is
to overlook the fact that Bishwambhar is a cultural leader…Therefore Bishwambhar
is positioned historically and culturally as the representative of culture, and as the
self-image of a culture” (Dube, 24).
As we have noted, Georges Bataille’s categorization of the rituals of the wealthy encompassed
the notion that a surplus was always consumed, not accumulated; thus, the rule of the ritual
implicated the sign of wealth as being created through the extravagance of its consumption.
Therefore, instead of the reckless spending of an addict to music, we can consider the zamindar’s
arrangements of music recitals, in spite of the predictably negative consequences, as a final
resistance to an impending colonization, a notion elaborated by Dube: “his refusal to lie down
and passively die, his reckless abandon in arranging one last jalsa, and even the excitement of his
manservant, all signal the colonial subject’s defiance of historical time” (ibid).
Biswambhar’s role of resistance is further elaborated in contrast to the two chess players from
Ray’s film Shatrank-ke-Khilatri (The Chess Players). While Ray’s depiction of Biswambhar’s
relation to music includes the appearance of reckless decisions being made (which we have
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Cooper bluntly appraises the zamindar’s reckless behaviour mimicking a discourse of addiction: “Biswambhar’s
manager informs him that the banks will not lend him any more money. [Therefore], to meet this expense, he orders
his manager to pawn some of the family jewels. This consolidates the vibhava or source of the zamindar’s downfall,
which lies principally in his obsessive love for classical music and the extravagance with which he consummates
this passion” (Cooper, 66).
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accounted for as a form of resistance), he also portrays the zamindar sympathetically; meanwhile
the music which is produced is some of the finest in film77. In contrast, as Darius Cooper notes,
“Ray is very unsympathetic to the Lucknowi chess players, constantly undermining their points
of view. This enables him to exhibit their characteristic blindness to everything around them
because of their obsession with chess” (Cooper, 203). There is little doubt that Ray infused in the
zamindar’s seemingly irrational decisions a form of social resistance, as Ganguly, who was “the
contrast figure to Biswambhar Roy…and represented the new age,” was a character given “no
redeeming features…no depth, no sympathy” (Nyce, 45). And, according to Nyce, this is
because Ray “has none of the modernist’s excitement and relish in the creation of new
forms…and is a classicist in his response to turbulence and change” (Nyce, 170). In fact, the
characters Roy and Ganguly evoke Eliade’s distinction between religious and nonreligious man,
wherein the zamindar is depicted as representing the sacred and Ganguly as the profane. This
notion is further supported by Cooper, who describes Biswambhar’s re-emergence into the
jalsaghar, which had been closed for four years in response to the death of the zamindar’s wife
and son who were ordered back from their journey in stormy weather in order to attend another
jalsa: “As [the servant] unfurls the carpets and dusts, the music room is counterpointed by
Biswambhar’s gradual emergence from his grieving passive state into the world of the living”
(Cooper, 67). As we know from the second chapter, according to Eliade “the sacred is preeminently the real, at once power, efficacity, the source of life…” (Sacred and Profane, 28).
Thus, while the zamindar’s ritualization of music gave him a sense of being78, the ritual was
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Despite his earlier proclamation, Ben Nyce says of Jalsaghar: “Its real subject is music – classical Indian music,
to be more exact – and it is one of the great treatments of music in film” (Nyce, 44).
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Both Dube and Nyce suggest the notion that the jalsa (musical recital) re-creates and sustains a hierarchical
(sacred) class and provides a sense of being: “the jalsa is the place where Bishwambhar and the audience experience
their cultural identity and self-proximity” (Dube, 26); “Ray subtly gives the impression that Biswambhar is as much
pleased by the social impression he has made on his guests as by the music itself” (Nyce, 47).

81
sacred not in relation to a cosmology, but as a sustainer of the wealthy class79, evidenced by the
fact that all jalsas were attended by royalty, and no servant was seen enjoying the performace.
Hence, we find in the case of Biswambhar Roy’s love for music a sacred ritualization which
Eliade would have otherwise deemed profane, supporting our earlier notion that modern State
and capitalist rituals are sacred, not profane, as Eliade proposed.
Nonetheless, a more salient point is that the zamindar’s ruthless decisions in staging musical
recitals, characteristic of a naturalizing discourse of addiction, are re-situated within a discourse
of prescribed sacred rituals, even in light of further characterizations which reflect components
of addiction, such as in the depiction of Biswambhar’s craving for the re-opening of the
jalsaghar80, or the zamindar’s deteriorating relationship with his wife: the zamindar’s wife
confronts her husband about their child’s problematic submersion (promoted by the zamindar)
and full attention to music, as the son has begun to neglect his studies. The discourse of the wife
reproduces the ‘harmfulness’ model associated with categorizing addiction, in which an authority
ascribes values of good/bad to different rituals. Only, in this case, while focusing on studies is
considered the good (sacred), and attention to music as an obstacle (profane) to attaining the
sacred, the creator of the discourse is the wife, who does not hold enough power to assert these
moral laws. The wife’s lack of power evokes the dual character of the religious function, namely
the creation of truths and the power to enforce them. This principle becomes more clearly
exemplified in the film The Chess Players, where the ruling King of Oudh, who also leads a life
of idleness and attraction to musical performances, is conquered by the British for his lack of
imperialist rule.
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To be a connoisseur of classical Indian music was a primarily wealthy ritual, thus it developed its own indicators
of social inclusion, such as the lifting of the index finger at the end of a sixteen track beat, an action partaken by
Biswambhar Roy during a jalsa.
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“As he waits for Ananta to unlock the jalsaghar, Ray cuts to a close-up of Biswambhar’s fingers nervously
tapping the knob of his cane” (Cooper, 67).
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Shatrank-ke-Khilatri (The Chess Players – 1977)
Much like Ray’s earlier film Jalsaghar, his cinematic depiction of a story by Munshi Premchand
also engages the colonization of rituals. While Premchand’s story focuses on the decadent
aristocratic society of Awadh (present-day Lucknow) as an unquestioned rationalization for
British take-over (Premchand’s portrayal of the chess players is highly unsympathetic), Ray’s
introduction of King Wajid and the British General Outram positions the viewer into a more
contextualized perspective of the subjects of addiction in the film – the artistocratic class of
landlord and king in a region (Awadh), that, according to Dube was “in popular memory and
folklore, the signifier for native excess in play” (Dube, 206)81. Therefore, as a site for “the
expanded cultural critique in colonialist discourse” (Dube, 29), the film goes beyond the
discourse of Jalsaghar as it highlights British discourse that engenders the negative perceptions
of idle pleasures.
While Ben Nyce suggests that “the film’s message is that the British were able to take over
because the kingdom and its citizens were ripe for the taking,” he not only cannot reconcile King
Wajid’s sympathetic portrayal, who “is revealed as fully human; and not villainous” (Nyce, 166),
he also does not address Ray’s change of the story’s ending which results in a more sympathetic
and ambiguous depiction of the two chess players than Premchand’s (in Premchand’s ending, the
two chess players died at the hands of their own obsession; in Ray, they remain alive as
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From Dube: “As late as 1901 Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim refers to Awadh (modern day Lucknow) in the
following terms: ‘There is no city – except Bombay, the queen of all – more beautiful in her garish style than
Lucknow…’ (Kim, ed., intro. and notes, Edward W. Said [1989] 168)”
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predictably colonized subjects82). While several critics discuss the political ambiguities of Ray’s
films, our interest lies in his depictions of the subjects of addiction.
Despite Ray’s change to the end of the story, the characters Mir and Mirza remain
unsympathetic83, though not for the reasons of an underlying pathological condition. In fact, the
British participation in chess depicted in the film suggests a disinterest in the nature of
obsessions as an object of study, substituted instead by addressing the force of colonization. For
instance, not only does Ray suggest that the British themselves played chess, but moreover, in
some instances their obsession and immersion into the game was greater than Mir and Mirza’s:
The visitor who interrupted Mir and Mirza’s chess game to tell the men that the East India
Company will take over their region of Awadh, after realizing his mistake offered to leave
promptly, saying that his British colleague wouldn’t even answer the door to any callers when
they played chess together. The key notion here is the fact that the British did not neglect to play
games like chess, but did so as a compliment to their territorial and economic objectives:
“–I see you’re playing the Indian way.
–What other way is there?
–The British way.
–Don’t tell me the Company has taken over chess too! … But why change the rules?
– Because it’s a faster game.
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Ray writes of his ending: “To spell it out for Rajbans what it says in effect is a) that Nawabi did not end with the
takeover; b) that upper class values were only superficially affected by British rule, and c) that feudal decadence was
a contributing factor in the consolidation of British rule in India” (Dube, 141).
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After Mirza’s wife has taken away the chess pieces, Ray depicts Mir and Mirza as pathetic junkies, suffering from
craving and withdrawal: In the morning, the two men stand in bewilderment, asking “what do we do now?” Mirza
replies, “shops are closed on Fridays. The entire day is ruined.” They set off go to see an old friend, because they
remember he has a chess set in his house. When they arrive, he is gravely ill; however, their mind remains on the
chess set and not on their ill friend. On their way home, and still without a game of chess to play, Mirza and Mir
stop to gamble at a controlled fight between goats, wherein Mir becomes very attracted before Mirza pulls him
away, perhaps because such a pursuit does not conform to the norms and values of noblemen. Sitting on a park
bench, with Mirza drawing a chess board in the dirt, Mir proclaims “What a glorious day, yet we have to spend it in
idleness.” So they decide to go home, with their chess table still in their possession, and use fruits, vegetables and
spice containers to represent chess pieces. They proceed to call the servant for the hookah, which is a fundamental
ritual to their enjoyment of the game. The servant then says to Mirza’s wife, “Who knows what magic there is in that
game?”
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–So they find our game too slow?
–Like our transport. Now we’re to have railway trains and the telegraph.”
While at first we may confuse Ray’s negative portrayal of Mir and Mirza as a result of their
obsession to chess (hence, intimating a pathological obsession), the object of his film is
ineludibly the authoritative moral position which can cast either a positive or negative light on a
ritual or obsession. Therefore, when Mir’s wife proclaims that “a man with his eyes on the
chessboard is lost to the world,” one can get the impression that an obsession to chess contains a
pathological essentialism. Yet, with the inclusion and castigation of the highly motivated and
prosperous British into the game of chess, we find such a universalism rejected. Moreover, Ray’s
treatment of King Wajid supports the notion that a ritual obsession is essentially neither good nor
bad. Thus, King Wajid, whose demeanour was in complete opposition to imperialist rule, and
whose immersion into music, poetry and dance became a rhetorical catalyst for the colonial takeover of the region, was nonetheless depicted as a ruler loved by his people.
Ray engages the idea that as some people perceived King Wajid lovingly and as aesthetically
rich, others viewed his rituals as an unacceptable form of rule: “Did you know,” General Outram
rhetorically questioned his assistant Weston, “that the King prayed five times a day?” As Cooper
notes, “the implication is that instead of ruling and administering, Wajid is more interested in
trivial and nonmonarchial activities like praying” (Cooper, 207). More importantly perhaps is the
notion that, as Dube claims, “Ray’s screenplay outlines how colonial discourse permits a narrow
range of terms and disallows true inquiry” (Dube, 31). The demonizing cultural critique of
Awadh by the British was therefore not an objective account84, but was rather engendered from
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“By 1856, the year of Awadh’s takeover by the British, the colonialist expanded cultural critique evolved into a
full-fledged discourse. The expanded cultural critique of Awadh was based on scholarship and hearsay by British
administrator-scholars who did extensive research into Awadh, only in order to condemn various aspects of the
culture such as dance, poetry, music, all forms of popular entertainments like kite flying, cock-fighting, gambling as
well as Hindu and Muslim practices of dress, food, and religion” (Dube, 29).
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the start by a territorializing State and economic force which condemned any social practices that
opposed sacred ideals. Thus, by prescribing idleness and play as characteristic of the profane, not
only was the colonization of Awadh rationalized, but also in addiction we may recognize the
same ‘religious’ mechanism of colonizing rituals into the sacred and the profane.
That Ray is disinterested in facilitating a discourse of addiction is supported not only by his
implication of authority in the colonial work/play distinction, or in the implicit acceptance of Mir
and Mirza’s chess obsession by their Muslim authorities (as they were evidently able to fulfill
their religious duties), but also in the territorializing attempts of Mirza’s wife. That is, besides the
colonial discourse, with Mirza’s wife we encounter the profanization of idleness and play.
Furthermore, in contrasting the discourses of colonialism and Mirza’s wife, we see that the wife
in fact reflects a discourse closer to the characteristic discourse of addiction. That is, while the
colonial discourse refers to the decadent play of Awadh as a wastefulness of time and rescources,
it is Mirza’s wife who materializes a model of the chess ritual as an individualized manner which
ought to be stopped. Thus, as Mirza’s wife, as well as the zamindar’s wife from Jalsaghar,
attempt to create a moral law (‘jalsas are bad!’ or ‘chess is bad!’) but fail on account of a lack of
sacred power, we see the elaboration of an object of Ray’s films, namely the abstract power to
colonize rituals, despite whether they are rationalized by ‘sacred’ cosmologies or economic
principles. In this respect, the same territorialization of rituals based on moral rationalizations
may also be said to have materialized in discourses of addiction.
While Cooper proclaims that Mir and Mirza “have invited their own doom and the collapse of
their beloved city by displaying a completely futile and reckless whim of aristocratic excess,”
and in spite of their harsh moral depiction by Ray, we are given the sense that their idleness and
ritualization of excess goes beyond the individual. Thus, in the prologue to Shatrank-ke-Khilatri,
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we are introduced into the chess players’ condition as such: “You may ask, ‘Have they no work
to do?’ Of course not! Whoever heard of the land gentry working? These are noblemen…” Yet,
as Cooper elaborates, “Since both have “hereditary jagirs” (inherited property) and don’t have to
earn a living, chess becomes a consuming passion to pass their idle hours” (Cooper, 186). The
contradictory subject of the sacred is thus evoked by Cooper, who states separately that Mir and
Mirza ‘have invited their own doom’ at the same time that they ‘inherited’ their ritualizations of
idleness. Ray’s response to this contradiction appears to be in the valuation of resistance to (the
seemingly unpreventable85) conquest, as he sympathetically portrays the resistor and desacralizes
the coward.
Charulata (1964)
While the previous two films have dealt directly with a primary character immersed in their idle
rituals, the film Charulata subjectifies the bhadralok Bhupati86, who is not only greatly occupied
with his newspaper (which leaves his wife Charulata with no time for affection), but he also
contends that it represents the real, as opposed to the rituals of decadence, literature and women.
Charulata is another film by Satyajit Ray that addresses rituals of boredom (or idleness) within
the manifestation of the modern age. Furthermore, these rituals are once again territorialized
based on their relation to sacred ideals. In this case, they oppose the colonial ideal of economic
imperialism and are therefore deemed profane; yet, for Charulata, her rituals of idleness actually
re-create her secondary position in society. Therefore, the colonization of rituals can materialize
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According to Nyce, both King Wajid and the zamindar Biswambhar Roy faced a futile situation: “King Wajid
brings to my mind the feudal landlord Biswambhar Roy of Jalsaghar. Both are aware that they represent the end of
a way of life which exalts beauty, and yet both are unable to prevent the forces of change from destroying them”
(Nyce, 168).
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A bhadralok was “a bourgeois elite whose exposure to European literature, philosophy, and science bred a
profound enthusiasm for the liberal-humanist traditions of the West” (S Ganguly, 56).
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into more than simply strict prohibitions; rather, profane rituals can be permitted to the extent
that they reaffirm sacred authorities.
Bhupati’s immersion into politics and the newspaper can be traced “to 1835 when British
legislation introduced Western education into India,” wherein a class of people were designed to
be produced as “Indian in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in
intellect” (S Ganguly, 56). An image of the colonization of rituals emerges in the celebration
Bhupati and his friends were holding to honor the new British Premier, wherein “we learn that
Bhupati’s friend, on the eve of the election, made an offering to the Hindu goddess Kali to
ensure a liberal victory” (S Ganguly, 60). In contrast to the castigation by the invading British
General Outram of the ritual prayers of King Wajid of Lucknow, the Hindu ritual performed by
Bhupati’s friend invoked the permission (by sacred authority, in this case the British) to engage
in rituals, so long as they re-create the sacred world – thus, by using a Hindu sacrifice to ensure a
liberal British victory, we encounter the materialization of colonized rituals.
Moreover, as Bhupati represents a subject of British colonization, his distinction between ‘the
real’ and ‘decadence’ evokes the function of the sacred in Eliade’s texts, as discussed in the
second chapter, by not only separating the world into sacred and profane space, (where only the
sacred represents true reality), but also by rationalizing the profanization of a ritual based on a
moral law (which typically means a ritual that opposes the re-creation and sustainment of a
sacred world). Thus, in the film, Bhupati engages his cousin: “Amal, politics is different. Politics
is a living thing. Real. Palpable.” Meanwhile, that which opposes his newspaper (“plays, novels,
poetry” – idleness) is deemed decadent, or profane. Bhupati’s insistence that politics and the
newspaper represent the real ineludibly reflects British ideals of liberalism, wherein work
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represents the sacred ideal, and in opposition, ‘decadent’ rituals of literature are deemed
unproductive, ornamental and part of the profane87.
That idleness represents a colonized ritual of the profane is evidenced by its presence in
Charulata and its opposition in the work-obsessed Bhupati – who, by enumerating his wife
alongside the “delights” of plays, novels and poetry, inscribes her secondary or profane status.
Moreover, as Cooper notes, to trace the etymology of each of the characters’ names would reveal
that “both masculine names (bhupati and amal) are given connotations of importance,
independence, and patriarchal privilege, [while] the feminine name is not allowed any
autonomy” (Cooper, 83). Therefore, Charulata’s rituals of idleness, while representing the
profane, are permitted because they contribute to re-creating the sacred ideals, in this case
patriarchy. As modern nonreligious authorities tend to evoke a sacred function, the profanization
of some rituals may only perform a hierarchical distinction, whereas their materialization
actually re-creates the sacred world: “She is expected to sew, supervise all domestic chores,
serve meals to her husband, and cultivate her idle moments in the practice of ‘feminine’ pastimes
like playing cards, embroidery, reading, playing the piano, and decorating herself for her spouse”
(Cooper, 86).
Similar to Jalsaghar and Shatrank-ke-Khilatri, Ray depicts Bhupati as a subject of addiction
only in relation to his wife (the title of the original story, written by Tagore, is The Broken Nest).
As his colonized ideals have spawned a preoccupation with his work, this has left him unable to
satisfy the emergence of his wife, Charulata. Ray’s depiction of Bhupati’s failure to help
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In his summation of British liberalism, M.R.R. Ossewaarde identifies the sacralization of work and the
profanization of play : “Mandeville, Adam Smith and David Ricardo insisted that the market was the ideal
embodiment of the ‘liberal’ principle of individuals being the best judges of their own (selfish) interests. They
polarized the roles of the State and the market, and held that limited government maximized the collective interest.
Market Liberals do not give priority to human creativity and selfimprovement, but to market efficiency”
(Ossewaarde, 3)
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facilitate Charulata’s emergence, primarily a result of his obsession with his newspaper, is
elaborated by the director’s gaze at Charulata in the opening sequence of the film, wherein the
camera gives Charulata (and her idle musings) the attention she deserves, and with the scene’s
transition through the wistful steps of Bhupati who walks right Charulata without noticing her.
Nonetheless, Ray’s portrayal of Bhupati as a subject of addiction remains highly historicized and
non-pathological.
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Conclusion
Extol the Soviet Union,
Our ninety-proof communion!
—from the “Song of the Komsomols”88
“They said they would rather be outlaws a year in Sherwood Forest than President of the United
States forever.”
–––Mark Twain, The Adventures of Tom Sawyer
We certainly have a problem at hand, but it is mostly a social problem, not a drug problem per
se.
–––Robert Deitch, Hemp – American History Revisited

The films by Satyajit Ray discussed in the third chapter effectively evince the failure of
discourses of addiction (which propose scientific theorizations of addiction) to account for the
social components of the concept. Instead, the scientific affirmation of addiction based on harm
re-creates a discourse that materializes into techniques of colonization, whether it is people,
territory, drugs or rituals. Moreover, we have seen how religious, State and economic forces
have, to a large extent, formed the scientific characteristics which are associated with addiction
today.
While the modern form of addiction was originally constituted by a substance related abuse, the
institutional inclusion of gambling and the internet as having addictive potential has opened the
doors wide open for prospective diagnoses. And yet, while scientific discourses continue to
theorize addiction (as they evidently have for over a century), the function of power as a tool of
social (class, State) relations will continue to colonize the ‘harmful’ drugs or rituals.
The theorization of addiction lies outside the sciences, just as addictions lie within moral
precepts of the bad (or outside moral precepts of the good). As State and economic/class forces
prescribe the sacred (the good path in life) and the profane (the bad path), in addition to addictive
88
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rituals the so-called non-addictive pursuits have also been thoroughly colonized, only their
ritualization includes belonging to the sacred world, unlike profane subjects of addiction. As
noted in the second chapter, Deleuze and Guattari elaborate on this illusion of choice between
‘sacred’ rituals:
“A determination different from that of the constant will therefore be considered
minoritarian, by nature and regardless of number, in other words, a subsystem or an
outsystem. This is evident in all the operations, electoral or otherwise, where you are
given a choice, but on the condition that your choice conform to the limits of the
constant (‘you mustn't choose to change society...’)” (Deleuze and Guattari, 105).
In the films by Ray, we find a similar dual presence of force and resistance. In particular, as
Reena Dube asserts, in Jalsaghar the zamindar’s “refusal to lie down and passively die, his
reckless abandon in arranging one last jalsa, and even the excitement of his manservant, all
signal the colonial subject’s defiance of historical time” (Dube, 24). She says that “this resistance
to colonial/national history has to be understood in social, not personal terms” (ibid). Can we
theorize addiction in a similar manner?
In contrast to a discourse of addiction, a discourse on addiction reverses the object of addiction
from the addict to the authors of moral laws and the forces which precipitate them. What is at
stake in these discourses is not only the bourgeois subject and the subject of addiction, and their
respective rituals, but the Other outside of the sacred and profane. How do we resist the illusion
of choice which Deleuze and Guattari referred to? How do we subvert the over-saturation of
pharmaceutical, economic or State discourses and ritualizations?
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